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Tax competition and the move from insurance to assistance 
Michaël ZEMMOUR
1
 
Abstract: The funding of social protection has strongly evolved in Bismarckian countries: 
whereas social protection used to rely on social contributions, since the 1990s most of the new 
expenditures have been funded through taxation, leading to a more balanced mix in the 
structure of social protection revenue. I propose a formal model in which two social 
protection systems may coexist: insurance funded through social contributions and assistance 
funded through taxation. Insurance level is set by consensus between firms and unions, 
whereas assistance expenditures are set by a majority vote in parliament. Social insurance can 
be manipulated to influence preferences in respect of assistance. It is shown how an 
exogenous increase in tax competition in a Bismarckian context can lead to the emergence of 
a mixed model: assistance increases to complement existing insurance, not to replace it. A 
time series cross-section analysis on 9 countries over 25 years supports the idea that a drop in 
corporate tax rates can trigger a shift in the tax structure of social protection funding. 
Résumé : Le financement de la protection sociale a fortement évolué dans les pays 
bismarckiens: alors que ces pays privilégient historiquement le financement par cotisation 
sociale, on constate que les nouvelles dépenses survenues depuis les années 1990 ont été 
financées essentiellement par le budget de l'Etat. L'article propose un modèle formel dans 
lequel deux systèmes de protection sociale coexistent: l'assurance, financée par cotisation et 
l'assistance, financée par l'impôt. Le niveau d'assurance est négocié par les partenaires sociaux 
tandis que le niveau de l'assistance est entre les mains du parlement. Les partenaires sociaux 
peuvent manipuler le niveau de l'assurance pour influencer la demande politique concernant 
l'assistance. Les résultats montrent comment dans un contexte bismarckien, une augmentation 
exogène de la concurrence fiscale peut expliquer le développement d'un régime mixte 
assistance/assurance. Une analyse économétrique sur un panel de 9 pays et sur 25 années 
établit une synchronie entre concurrence fiscale et évolution de la structure du financement de 
la protection sociale. 
Keywords: assistance, institutional change, insurance, political economy, tax-competition, veto. 
Mots-clés: changement institutionnel, cotisations sociales, finances publiques, économétrie 
comparative, microéconomie de la protection sociale, taxation. 
JEL: P16, H5, H2 
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1. Introduction  
In this paper, I argue that the development of tax-funded assistance and the relative decline of 
insurance in Bismarckian countries can be traced back to the intensification of tax 
competition. The development of Bismarckian social insurance was the historical outcome of 
a corporatist compromise in response to political demand for social protection. Business had 
an incentive to compromise because of the threat of statist intervention: social insurance was a 
means of preventing the implementation of a universal scheme associated with a high level of 
taxation of profits. The increase in tax competition associated with financial openness 
changed the political equilibrium by offering most profitable firms a better exit option.  
*** 
The consequences of globalisation on welfare states in general and social protection in 
particular remain ambiguous: whereas the intensification of international trade and tax 
competition should theoretically have triggered a race to the bottom (Pestieau [2006], Avi 
Yonah [2000]), the increase in social risk due to globalisation has increased political demand 
for social protection.
2
 Empirically, no evidence has so far emerged of a race to the bottom in 
social protection spending (Pestieau [2006]). As far as corporatist countries in Europe are 
concerned, the expansion of public social protection expenditure has been the rule at the 
aggregate level:
3
 the share of GDP dedicated to social protection expenditure tended to grow 
in most continental and Mediterranean European countries between 1980 and 2008, whereas 
other countries of Western Europe (i.e. the Nordic and liberal countries) experienced sharp 
retrenchment episodes.
4
 
Nonetheless, social protection has undergone important structural changes in Bismarckian 
countries since the beginning of the 1990s. One of the most important is the deformation of 
the social protection funding structure in those countries: whereas social protection was 
typically funded through social contributions (earmarked payroll taxes) in Bismarckian 
schemes, the share of budgetary expenditure in social protection funding has increased in all 
countries of continental Europe since the beginning of 1990s, with the exception of the 
Netherlands (Palier and Martin [2007], Eurostat [2008], Zemmour [2011]). On the 
                                                 
2 A review of the argument can be found in Genschel (2004) or Boix (2011). 
3 The picture may be more contrasted at the micro level. 
4 This stylised fact is not attributable to the differential in the growth rate: the same result is obtained when using 
potential GDP as opposed to real GDP. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.90 (Version révisée)
 3 
 
expenditure side, this change is associated with a relative decline in insurance schemes 
(contributory benefits) as compared with assistance mechanisms (non-contributory schemes, 
delivering universal or targeted flat or means-tested benefits). A careful analysis of the 
aggregate data shows something unexpected: the relative decline of social contributions in 
social protection funding is not due to cuts in social contributions. In general, the aggregate 
level of social security contributions, after a phase of rapid increase, has remained steady 
since the 1990s. The change is that new expenditure has been funded through other tax 
revenue. Thus, in spite of a few episodes where the revenue derived from some social security 
contributions has been shifted to alternative taxation (France and Italy in 1997-1998, 
Germany in 2007), the change in the funding structure is attributable far more to an increase 
of tax-funded expenditure than to a substitution of social contribution by other taxes (see 
Figure 1). 
Figure II- 1: Social protection and its funding structure (in GDP points) 
 
Source: OECD, points of GDP. 
The puzzle addressed by this paper is thus the following: how is it that Bismarckian countries 
have become less and less Bismarckian as far as their tax system is concerned? Why are they 
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shifting towards a mixed model as it is observed? Why has this change occurred at different 
times in each country? 
An extensive literature on social protection funding gives arguments in favour of abandoning 
social security contributions with respect to trade competitiveness, labour cost, 
unemployment, etc. I will review them in the literature section. But due to their normative 
perspective, they are more convincing in explaining why reform should happen, rather than 
why it did or did not and the form it took: as shown by Saint-Paul (2000) in the case of labour-
market reforms, even suboptimal policy can be very resilient if some groups are in a position 
to prevent any reform of the status quo.  
Amable and Palombarini (2009) argue that the causal determinant of institutional change is 
the dynamics of the socio-political coalitions that support institutions. The defeat of one 
coalition by another, a change in the economic interests of one or several of its members, or a 
change in the balance of power within the coalition can trigger institutional change. In this 
perspective, this paper intends to explore the material determinant of social protection 
institutions by paying attention to the interests of socioeconomic groups and the modality of 
the political mediation between them.  
I propose a framework in which two possible social schemes coexist: insurance and 
assistance. For a stylised representation, both systems differ in their funding structure 
(contributions vs taxation) and their benefit calculations (earnings-related vs flat-rate 
benefits), but not in their scope or coverage.
5
 Insurance is governed by corporatist bargaining 
between firm representatives and unions, whereas assistance depends on fiscal policy, i.e. on 
parliament and its constituency – namely taxpayers. Using a formal model, I show how these 
dimensions can interact: social insurance can be manipulated to influence preferences on 
assistance. I analyse the conditions under which a Bismarckian compromise emerges in 
favour of the development of social insurance. It is shown how an exogenous increase in tax 
competition
6
 in a Bismarckian context can lead to the emergence of a mixed model: assistance 
                                                 
5 I am aware that this is generally not the case: insurance coverage is generally limited to workers, whereas 
assistance is not necessarily universal and may be targeted on the poorest. Yet I have assumed that coverage is 
the same so as to focus on the taxation and benefit-calculation aspect. Moreover, it has often been argued that the 
change in social protection funding can be explained by the universalisation of social protection (see literature 
section). I show in the model that this is not necessarily true: it is quite possible that unions prefer social 
insurance to social assistance, even if insurance is very broad-based and includes a redistributive portion. 
6 The intuition that tax competition is liable to undermine the stability of an existing political arrangement comes 
from Amable and Gatti (2004) on another topic. The model presented in section 4 is also inspired by this work. 
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increases to complement existing insurance, not to replace it, just as it has been observed in 
Bismarckian countries. A time series cross-section analysis on nine countries over 25 years 
supports the idea that a drop in the corporate tax rate can trigger a shift in the tax structure of 
social protection funding. 
1.1. The argument  
In corporatist countries, the power of raising taxes and budgetary expenditure is not identical 
to the power of raising or lowering social contributions (elaboration on this point can be found 
in Bonoli an Palier [1996, 2000], Palier [2005] and Koreh and Shalev [2009]). In a nutshell, 
budgetary expenditure (and taxation) depends solely on the government and on a decision by 
parliament, but changing the contribution rate depends on an agreement being reached 
between unions and employer associations. If no consensus is reached to change the 
contribution rate, the former rate applies
7
 (Figure 2). 
  
                                                 
7 This is clearly a very stylised picture: the role of the government may be much more important and the role of 
social partners may vary across countries and social schemes. Nonetheless, the fact that social insurance is a 
matter of social bargaining whereas social assistance is in the hands of the state (or an infra-state entity) is an 
established fact.  
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Figure II- 2: A model of decision making in social protection 
 
It is assumed that the decision taken in social bargaining (on the left hand side) precedes the 
parliamentary decision (on the right).  
Thus, there is no unified governance of social protection as a coherent system.
8
 On the 
contrary, the level of social contributions and the level of public social protection expenditure 
stem from two separate decisions, made in interaction, by different actors under specific rules. 
This can easily be understood if one has in mind, for instance, the interaction between 
unemployment insurance (governed by unions and employers) and minimal income (French 
RSA, German Harz IV, etc.), which is dependent on the government. One of the contributions 
of this dissertation is seriously to consider this institutional distinction as a means of 
comprehending trends in social protection. 
Consequently, the decline of corporatist social protection should be analysed as the product of 
two mechanisms (Figure 1 and 2): i) the freeze of the contribution rate and ii) the existence of 
a parliamentary majority in favour of raising budgetary expenditure dedicated to social 
protection. 
Based on this analysis, I propose an argument explaining the political sclerosis of the 
corporatist part of social protection over the last 20 years. 
                                                 
8 Except if a general consensus among all stakeholders is built, as may have been the case in the Netherlands. 
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In the advanced democracies, there is broad demand for a public social protection scheme to 
shelter against social risk. By default (i.e. in the absence of any other scheme), this demand 
will be addressed by the state through the implementation of assistance (if there is a majority 
to implement such a system). But social partners have at their disposal the means to avoid 
state intervention by setting up an alternative system:
9,
 
10
 social insurance. Indeed, if social 
insurance is important enough (in terms of generosity and coverage), it can reduce political 
demand for a statist schemes to a negligible level. Firms will support corporatist social 
protection when the expected cost of the social contributions borne by employers is lower 
than the taxation expected to fund assistance. This support accordingly depends on the 
effective ability of the state to tax profits: if this ability is low (because of capital mobility and 
intense tax competition), firms will prefer an increase in assistance to an increase in insurance 
because assistance-related taxation will cause little damage to their profits.
11
 Labour unions 
support corporatist social protection as long as they consider assistance as too redistributive 
towards the poor (and possibly less generous for workers).
12
  
At the constitutional stage, if the context makes firms and unions supportive of social 
insurance, a Bismarckian outcome will emerge: social insurance crowds out assistance. 
Should one or the other parties be opposed to it, a statist assistance scheme will prevail. But 
this can also happen in a context where Bismarckian insurance already exists: if at a given 
time, one of the social partners prefers statist social protection to social insurance, it will 
become impossible for the other one to obtain an increase in social insurance. Conversely, the 
social partner supportive of assistance will be unable to obtain a substantive cut in social 
insurance without a consensus. If such a situation were to arise in a Bismarckian framework, 
social insurance would be frozen at its previous level and variation in demand for social 
protection would be addressed by assistance. This is my reading of Figure 1: after decades of 
dynamism, social insurance is almost frozen at its historic level. At least one of the social 
partners (unions I argue) still prefers social insurance: were this not to be the case, there 
would have been a massive transfer from insurance to assistance. 
                                                 
9 This is historically documented, at least for Germany at the end of the 19th century, and for France after WW2. 
10 On the emergence of corporatism in general (not in the single dimension of social protection), Jo Martin and 
Swank (2012) make the same argument concerning the Danish case. 
11 In a recent note, Askenazy (2012) endorses a similar view on the link between social contributions and profit 
taxation: “Today, we cannot rule out seeing a reduction in labour costs through reduced employer contributions 
translating simply into (...) [a] transfer of surplus profits generated in countries with lower corporate tax and 
growth in dividends (…)”. 
12 This assumption is in line with the results obtained by Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007), except that they do not 
include the specific role of firms. 
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The increase in budget-funded social protection can be seen as government’s response to 
political demand for more social protection (especially because of ageing) in a context where 
corporatist social protection is frozen.
13
 This response is probably supported by labour: even 
though unions prefer corporatist social protection to universal assistance, they will clearly 
prefer social assistance to nothing as a means of addressing new needs. 
To return to the puzzle of the globalisation-social protection nexus, the hypothesis tested here 
is that the increase in tax competition did not primarily affect the level of social protection, 
but rather the way in which social demand is politically addressed. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in section 2, I propose a review of the 
literature. In section 3, I present a model formalizing the argument. Section 4 display 
empirical evidence and section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature 
In this section I summarise the main reasons that could have led to change in the funding 
structure of social protection in corporatist countries, according to the literature (2.1). I 
explain why I see tax competition as a major channel of transmission of the globalisation 
effect (2.2). I then review empirical evidence on tax competition in Europe (2.3) and present 
recent analysis on the tax competition-social protection nexus (2.4). 
2.1. Theories on the decline of Bismarckian system: the trade side 
of “globalisation theory” 
I argue that tax competition induced a decline in social security contributions in social 
protection funding. But many other explanations have been provided as to why the 
Bismarckian style of social protection funding has been abandoned (and why it is better to do 
so). I briefly review here the main explanations found in the literature. They are generally 
related to labour-cost issues and “globalisation theory”, from its trade-openness perspective 
rather than in its financial-openness version. 
 Social contributions generate unemployment  
                                                 
13 The item “budgetary expenditure” includes the public deficit, but a closer look at the national accounts shows 
that deficit spending has not been used to boost social protection expenditure: tax-funded social protection has 
been paid either by higher taxation or by cuts in other public expenditure (Appendix 7.5). 
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Social contributions are seen as distortive, at least when funding non-contributory benefits. 
Basically, the share of social contributions that is not perceived as income by workers creates 
a wedge between the net wage and the labour cost, thereby preventing adjustment in the 
labour market between labour supply and labour demand (Cahuc and Zylberberg [2001]).  
Moreover, when unemployment is high, this model requires that social contributions be 
increased in order to maintain the benefit level, which in turn tends to generate 
unemployment. Consequently, the corporatist model of social protection funding, designed in 
a time of full employment, is seen as particularly vulnerable and self-weakening in a time of 
growing unemployment. Esping-Andersen (1996) depicts this situation by the phrase “welfare 
states without work”. One view (currently expressed in the academic literature and in the 
public debate) is that the Bismarckian model has become economically and politically 
unsustainable, stuck in a negative spiral. 
This logic can be reinforced by the globalisation of trade: not only do social contributions 
create a wedge between the net wage and labour cost, they also prevent firms from adjusting 
their labour cost in response to their competitors from non-corporatist countries, making them 
less competitive. This is why a shift in social contributions to VAT could favour 
competitiveness and employment (Gauthier [2009], Le Cacheux [2012]). 
 Social contributions cannot fund universal benefits  
This argument is related to the preceding one, but refers more to a distributional conflict than 
to the employment effect. Social contributions are a way to deal with the risk of wage loss by 
creating mandatory public social insurance that maintains a proportion of people’s incomes. 
This design was the cornerstone of the Bismarckian model of social protection, but is not 
suited to change in a world in which most social protection schemes (especially health 
insurance) have tended to become universal. In this context, the corporatist funding of social 
protection tends to make employees pay for the social protection of all citizens, including 
children, students, the unemployed, etc. In an extreme case, in a system where corporatist 
funding supports a universal benefit scheme, it is possible that a person living on capital gains 
may pay no social contributions (he/she perceives no wages), but does receive benefits. An 
alternative tax base, not focused solely on labour, would therefore be a more appropriate 
means of funding such universal benefit schemes. This view is advocated by some scholars 
(Sterdyniak and Villa [1998]), and has also been endorsed by certain unions (Palier [2005]). 
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 The exhaustion of the corporatist system 
The previous two arguments are fairly normative: scholars suggest that corporatist social 
protection can be economically suboptimal. But it can also have positive political 
implications: if citizens fear unemployment, firms concerned by the employment rate could, 
for instance, back cuts in social contributions. In fact, political economists have argued that 
the inefficiency of corporatist social protection has led to its political exhaustion: 
“ [We describe the implementation] and the progressive exhaustion of the first type of 
(…) labour-shedding strategy as well as increases in social contribution rates. These 
(…) policies were partly exhausted by their endogenous disequilibrium asking ever 
fewer people in work to be ever more productive, and to pay for ever more social 
expenditure. The more deeply this strategy was implemented, the fewer human and 
fiscal resources there were to sustain it (...)” (Palier [2010], p. 367).  
 The consequence of globalisation: labour cost has become a critical issue 
The increasing openness of markets for goods, labour and capital has changed the balance of 
power between economic and political actors in favour of the most mobile ones. For instance, 
the global integration of certain markets (e.g. textile) first put constraints on wage bargaining, 
then fostered the development of the relevant sectors in countries where the unit labour cost 
was the lowest, to the detriment of others.  
In view of this consideration, the inefficiency of corporatist funding of social protection (for 
the reasons stated above) would have become a critical issue, because globalisation has 
facilitated a more efficient allocation of capital and labour. In a time of globalisation, social 
contributions are not only inefficient but also increase the risk of prompting firms to relocate. 
Genschel (2004) underlines that a stream of literature sees globalisation as revelatory of the 
economic inefficiency of the corporatist arrangement. For Palier ed. (2010), this mechanism is 
conveyed by the European Union:  
(...) there was an exogenous element that pushed actors to reassess their strategy and 
that provided arguments (if not real constraints) for a first reorientation. In most of the 
cases, this exogenous element came from the implementation of the single market and 
the preparation of the European single currency. This new context was crucial for 
revealing the failure of the initially adopted strategy” (ibid.).  
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 Corporatism as a component of the industrial era 
An alternative view associates the decline of the Bismarckian system not to globalisation but 
to technological change: corporatism was born in the industrial sector and had a function in 
coordinated capitalism. Social protection works as an incentive to get specific skills required 
by industry (Iversen and Soskice [2001]), and helps insure against skill depreciation. 
Moreover, corporatist social protection was historically bargained between employers’ 
associations and unions in the industrial sector, before being progressively extended to others. 
Progressive deindustrialisation has gradually undermined the social compromise that 
previously underpinned Bismarckian social protection, forcing labour to look for a new means 
of funding social protection (see Palier and Thelen [2010]). Simultaneously the 
deindustrialisation strengthens the political demand for social protection (Iversen and Cusack 
[2000]).  In a way, this is a sophisticated version of globalisation theory, since 
deindustrialisation is attributable partly to the relocation of labour-intensive manufacturing in 
a context of globalisation.  
2.2. What is the main causal mechanism linking globalisation 
and the welfare state: trade openness or tax competition? 
This paper clearly adopts the globalisation theory perspective: while high unemployment, 
ageing and other factors are long-term trends that started at the beginning of the 1980s (i.e. 
before the decline of the Bismarckian model), globalisation, defined as trade and financial 
deregulation, has constituted a major shock over a short period of time, able to modify 
economic and political equilibriums and make more costly suboptimal arrangements on the 
labour market like corporatist social protection. But, as noted by Genschel (2004), 
globalisation theory includes at least two causal mechanisms: trade openness and tax 
competition. My claim is that the abovementioned literature on continental welfare states 
tends to overestimate the role of trade openness and to underestimate the role of tax 
competition (although both effects can potentially be combined).  
Indeed, what globalisation does is to make factors more mobile, thereby putting pressure on 
governments to cut taxes: if tax pressure is too high, capital, labour and/or profits can be 
relocated to increase firms’ profitability. Yet if this mechanism holds, the most sensitive 
channel should relate to the most mobile tax base: this is why, for instance even in a 
globalised context, household taxation is seen as far more effective than capital taxation.  
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To that extent, profit (and more precisely the high level generated by multinational firms) is 
clearly the most mobile tax base: while there are several economic reasons for capital or 
labour not to be relocated (in sectors not exposed to trade, because costs are not recoverable 
or because of a favourable institutional and economic context), there is almost no reason for 
profits not to be shifted to a tax haven since such a move is possible without relocating the 
production process. For this reason, I argue that tax competition should have at least as 
dramatic an effect on business strategy as an increase in trade openness, and I intend to 
explore the nexus between tax competition and social protection funding.  
2.3. Tax competition on corporate taxation: a brief review 
An extensive literature has dealt with tax competition on corporate profit taxation in the 
European Union. The main mechanisms and outcomes are sketched out in this section, but a 
recent and more comprehensive review of the literature on this topic can be found in Genschel 
and Schwarz (2011). 
In a nutshell, there are at least two channels through which tax competition can lead to a 
decline in the corporate tax rate: investment location and profit shifting. Since the European 
Union is a free-trade zone, and since transport costs are relatively low, access to any of the 
EU’s domestic markets is not constrained by a firm’s location. In this context, a firm’s 
location can respond to incentives such as low corporate taxation. Thus, a decision by one 
state (say Ireland) to cut its corporate tax rate puts pressure on other EU states to follow suit. 
Yet this channel is not necessarily the main one, since capital location also responds to other 
determinants (institutional environment, labour force, labour cost, etc.), and since it only 
applies for new investments: once capital has been located in a country, the cost of relocating 
it is considerable. 
The second channel, associated with financial openness, is profit shifting: through transfer-
pricing manipulation, decisions on patent location, headquarter location, or inter-firm business 
within the same multinational group, multinational firms have many means at their disposal to 
locate profits in the country offering the lowest level of taxation (Hines [1999]). Unlike 
locating a firm, profit shifting is an inexpensive exercise (it has no impact on the production 
process) and can even concern profits generated by investments made in the past. Theoretical 
elaboration of this argument can be found in Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011), while 
a recent empirical estimate of profit shifting in Europe can be found in Huizinga and Laeven 
(2008) and Karkinsky and Rieden (2012) on patent location. 
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These mechanisms, trade openness and financial openness, compounded by a non-cooperative 
attitude between countries (Hugounenq et al. [1999], Le Cacheux [2002], Simmons [2006]), 
triggered a tax-competition process in the late 1990s and the 2000s: i) investment and/or 
profits tend to be attracted by low-tax countries; and, in response, ii) states tended to cut their 
corporate tax rate, thereby reducing the tax gap between countries. 
Recent evidence has been gathered and published on diverse aspects of this process. First, 
consistent evidence has underlined the link between cuts in statutory (and effective) corporate 
tax rates and the tax-competition process. (Slemrod [2004], Simmons [2006], Cassette and 
Patty [2008]). Overesch and Rincke (2011) estimate that up to 10 points of reductions in the 
corporate tax rate in the western European Union should be ascribed to intra-zone tax 
competition. Osterloh and Debus (2012) add that the effect of tax competition on corporate 
taxation can be mitigated (but only slightly) when left-wing governments are in office.
14
 In a 
similar perspective, Plümper et al. (2009) show that even if tax-competition affects countries, 
norms of fairness prevent some countries from cutting taxation on profits too deeply; this 
points to the emergence of a separate equilibrium rather than convergence towards a zero tax 
rate. 
In theory, a tax-competition mechanism can concern any kind of taxation, but one may 
assume that the intensity of tax competition will be strongest for the most mobile tax base, 
such as capital income in general and firms’ profits in particular (especially those of the most 
profitable ones). Thus, the effect of tax competition will not necessarily be to reduce the 
average tax burden on the economy, but to shift it from the most mobile tax base (capital 
income) to the least mobile ones (labour, consumption). This change, analysed and anticipated 
in Hugounenq et al. (1999) and Pestieau (2006, pp. 50-59), is backed up by recent evidence of 
a decrease in the ex-ante ratio of tax on capital to that on labour (Schwarz [2007], Devereux et 
al. [2002]).  
Thus, based on this literature and evidence, I take it as given that tax competition has reduced 
the ability of European states to raise revenue by raising corporate taxation: this does not 
mean simply that tax rates have decreased, it also implies that the fact that they have 
decreased under constraint is a clear signal that it will not be possible to raise them back. For 
                                                 
14 The analysis by Dupont et al. (2000) of the tax reform implemented between 2001 and 2003 by the French 
Socialist government is a good example of a left-wing government marginally cutting corporate taxation (table 2, 
p.188) but reluctant about adopting an aggressive tax-competition strategy because of its consequences in term 
of progressivity (p. 185).  
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instance, Le Cacheux (2006) argues that, in spite of past cuts in corporate taxation, the 
enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and the non-cooperative attitude of smaller 
countries have kept France under pressure to implement further tax reform. From now on, 
increases in corporate taxation will not be an option for governments wishing to raise tax 
revenue in order to increase social expenditure. 
Yet this evidence relies on the ex-ante tax ratio (statutory or effective average tax rate 
computed at the micro level, in view of the legal framework, interest rates, etc.), also called 
“forward-looking” in the literature. However, the same authors (Slemrod [2004], Simmons 
[2003], Schwarz [2007]) mention that there is no evidence of the effect of tax competition 
when using “backward-looking” indicators computed using effective tax revenue and 
aggregate profit indicators. For instance, in the period 1970-1993, Swank (1998) finds that the 
financial openness is in fact associated with higher corporate and social security tax revenue. 
 This does not mean that tax competition has no effect, but rather that there is no immediate 
linear relationship between the statutory corporate tax rate and corporate tax revenue. An 
extensive review of this point can be found in Clausing (2007). Among the reasons cited, 
there is the fact that cuts in the statutory rate have been accompanied by a broadening of the 
definition of taxable profit (Collins and Shackelford [1996], Lee and McKenzie [1989], 
Ruding [1992], all three cited by Simmons [2003]). Second, profit is all that is taxed, and less 
profitable firms can be exempted from corporate taxation; thus, the most profitable firms are 
likely to be attracted to low tax countries, while less profitable ones may stay in high-tax 
countries. A related argument is made by Swank (1998), who argues that capital mobility and 
tax competition have increased market efficiency and have in turn increased investment and 
tax revenue. Although this view appears optimistic today, it can account for individual cases 
such as Ireland, where a statutory tax rate among the lowest raised significant tax revenue by 
attracting multinationals’ profits. Third, the prevailing dual-taxation system allows some 
taxpayers to decide whether their capital income will be taxed as corporate profit or as 
personal income.
15
 As such, cuts in the corporate tax rate can make high taxpayers declare 
more profit and less personal income, artificially raising revenue labelled as “corporate-tax 
revenue”. 
  
                                                 
15 Due to this mechanism, corporate taxation plays the role of backstop in personal income taxation (Ganghof 
and Genschel [2008]), partly explaining the degressive nature of personal income tax for highest income decile 
(Landais et al. [2011]). 
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In this paper, I will use a forward-looking tax ratio, i.e. indicators closer to the statutory tax 
rate than effective tax revenue. There are two reasons for this: first, as stated above, forward-
looking indicators are a much better proxy for capturing tax-competition phenomena than 
aggregate revenue. Second, the statutory rate is a political variable, one that can be 
immediately identified as a political decision: a change in the statutory tax rate is a political 
decision made by the government, whereas a change in aggregate tax revenue may have non-
political origins. 
2.4. Tax competition and change in the welfare state 
Concerns about the effect of tax competition on the welfare state have long been raised. 
According to Genschel (2004), this is one side of “globalisation theory”,16 the other side being 
trade openness. For instance, Rodrik (1997) and Avi-Yonah (2000) underline the fact that 
excessive tax competition has put welfare states at risk by preventing national states from 
extracting sufficient revenue to fund benefits. Since no welfare states have in fact collapsed, 
some authors have argued that tax competition was only a minor determinant of welfare state 
expenditure (Hines [2006]). A third view proposes a diluted version of the effect of tax 
competition on social protection: it did not reduce public revenue, but constrained the ability 
to tax profits and pressured governments to increase/maintain the tax burden on labour 
(Genschel [2002]). This view is consistent with change in the capital-labour taxation ratio 
mentioned above. 
The recent work of Plümper and Troeger (2012) endorses this view and makes the argument 
that tax competition has led governments to rely more on the taxation of labour (especially 
social security contributions) and deficit spending to fund welfare expenditure. Interestingly, 
they make a strong argument that the consequences of tax competition on welfare states 
depend on whether benefits are funded through social security contributions or through the tax 
system. They conclude their study by asserting that:  
 
“While [Continental welfare states] could maintain a high level of social security 
transfers, the liberal economies had to cut down on tax-based redistribution and to 
increase social security transfers. Not all governments in liberal market economies 
were able or willing to do so. Accordingly, income inequality increased most in liberal 
economies whose governments did not or very little increase social security transfers: 
the US and the UK.” 
 
                                                 
16 According to which, globalisation would make a generous welfare state unsustainable. 
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Although convincing as far as liberal countries are concerned (they have been less resilient to 
tax competition than continental ones), this narrative is inconsistent with one major stylised 
fact: the share of social security contributions in social protection funding has decreased in 
continental welfare states, whereas the share funded through taxation (and not solely by 
deficit spending) has increased in those countries (see Figure 3 below). The purpose of this 
paper is precisely to fill in the missing part of this story: I argue that tax competition applies 
pressure to shift the tax burden on to the less mobile tax base, but that the burden has not been 
shifted on to social security contributions due to their political and institutional characteristics. 
On the contrary, other forms of taxation on less mobile tax bases (personal income tax, 
consumption, etc.) have been preferred. 
3. The economic model17 
3.1.  Foreword 
The purpose of the model presented here is to exhibit the distributive mechanism implied by 
the coexistence of social insurance and assistance, how these consequences can be affected by 
tax competition and how several political equilibriums arise, explaining the different national 
choices between insurance and assistance. The model is inspired by Casamatta et al. (2000) 
for social schemes and by Person and Tabellini (2000) for its political features. As in many 
articles focusing on social insurance systems (Casamatta et al. [2000], De Donder and 
Hindriks [1998], Conde-Ruiz and Galasso [2005]), I ignore the effect of taxation on the 
labour-market equilibrium
18
 to focus on the distributive consequences of taxation and social 
policy. An innovation of the model in comparison with political economy literature is to 
endogenise both the deadweight loss implied by labour taxation and the way this cost is 
shared between agents. In particular the deadweight loss will not be the same for all workers 
and for insurance and assistance schemes. 
3.2.  Basic framework 
The economy includes three kinds of agents: firms (F), skilled workers (SK) and unskilled 
workers (U). For what follows, I assume that the agents of each group adopt a homogeneous 
political attitude. Moreover I assume that no group can alone obtain a majority of votes. So, as 
                                                 
17 The reader not interested in algebra can jump to subsection 3.9, which presents the results of the model. 
18 I deliberately omit this effect here, assuming that the distributive effect of taxation strongly dominates the 
possible consequences on (un)employment. A more accurate picture could be obtained in further work by 
combining both effects.  
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in Person Tabellini (2000), I model the whole population as if it were comprised of three 
representative agents, one of each kind.  
The production is organised as follows: 
-SK, who earns a wage     when at work. 
-U, who earns a wage    when at work. It is assumed that      . 
-For each worker   at work, F makes a constant pre-tax profit   .  
Each worker   faces an exogenous probability    of wage loss (unemployment, sickness, etc.).  
It is assumed that       . For simplicity, I normalise    at 1, thereby assuming that 
unskilled's utility strictly increases with the generosity of social benefits.
19
 
Two social schemes coexist: social insurance and universal assistance. 
3.3. Social insurance 
Social contributions are levied on wages at a rate c
20
. Worker i gets an earnings-related 
benefit        when the social risk is realised, where   is a structural parameter of the 
scheme. 
The saturation of budgetary constraint yields: 
  
          
          
 
3.4. Universal assistance 
Labour is taxed at a rate   and profit at a rate    , where   accounts for the ability of the 
state to tax profit as opposed to labour.
21
 In what follows, I interpret   as the intensity of tax 
competition.  
                                                 
19 Put another way, it corresponds to the idea that their taxable income is so low and their risk exposure so high 
that the utility of the expected benefit always exceeds the disutility of taxation. This assumption seems highly 
reasonable for labour-market outsiders but also for low-wage workers. 
20 It is assumed here than even unskilled workers are eligible for social insurance. This is to make the least 
restrictive assumption possible with respect to my results, but one can obtain the very same result by assuming 
that unskilled workers are not entitled to social insurance. 
21 Formally,   is the profit-labour tax ratio. It can be affected either by profit shifting (a share of profit realised is 
practically excluded from the tax base), or by the implementation of an official dual taxation favourable to profit. 
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For simplicity and without loss of generality, taxation is re-expressed as if wages were the 
only tax base. So    is the tax rate, such as: 
   
           
   
 
All workers get the same benefit      when the risk is realised, where   is a structural 
parameter of the scheme. 
The saturation of budgetary constraint yields: 
  
          
     
 
3.5. The utility function of agents 
The utility functions of firms and workers are as follows:
22
 
Firm: 
      ∑          (               
 )     
 
 
Workers: 
                                                     
Where    and    are the cost of social contributions and taxation supported by worker  . The 
complementary share      and      are borne by the firm. 
3.6. Fiscal incidence of taxation and social contribution 
Based on the literature on taxation (Salanié [2011]), it is assumed that the cost sharing of 
labour taxation between firms and workers is as follows: 
 the share of taxation perceived by workers as expectable benefits for him/herself 
(auto-insurance), is a pure substitute of the net wage and is thus entirely paid by 
workers (through a moderation of the net wage); 
                                                 
22 These formal representations of utility functions and social insurance (earnings-related or uniform) are 
attributable to Casamatta et al. (2000). I do however introduce two modifications: i) the utility of agents is log-
linear to simplify the algebra, and ii) while Casamatta et al. (2000) study the case of a single scheme more or less 
earnings-related, I present the case in which two schemes coexist and interact. 
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 the distortive share of taxation perceived (the “deadweight loss”, i.e. the portion that 
cannot be considered as auto-insurance) is shared between employers and employees 
within the wage-bargaining process, according to their respective bargaining power; 
 Taxes levied on profits are paid solely by firms.23 
 
The share    of social insurance c paid by worker   is thus:
24
  
   
           
      
    
where    is the relative bargaining power of the firm taking values between 0 and 1.
25
  
The share    of social assistance borne by worker   is:
26
 
      
         
       
    
   
       
 
Clearly, the higher the tax competition (i.e. the lower the value of  ), the heavier the cost of 
assistance borne by workers. 
3.7. The political system 
Both schemes are associated with specific decision-making procedures:
27
  
 Social insurance level   is bargained between SK and F against the status quo   . The 
outcome of the bargaining is denoted   . 
   {
             
       
  
 
        
  
  
       
 
 
Meaning that   changes only if both social partners have a common interest in raising 
or lowering c in relation to its past value   . 
 
                                                 
23 A slight share of profit taxation is however indirectly shifted back on to workers through the taxation of 
labour: higher taxation of profits induces higher benefit expectations for workers, thereby leading them to accept 
a higher share of taxation on labour. 
24 Proof in appendix 7.1.1 a/. 
25   =1 is absolute power to the firm. 
26 Proof in appendix 7.1.1 b/ and c/. 
27 The coexistence of social bargaining and majority voting is used among others by Iversen and Soskice (2009) 
and Amable and Gatti (2004). 
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 Universal assistance is set at the preferred level of the median voter among the three 
agents (which is a representation of majority voting). 
The timeline of the decision is the following: 
T=0: Initial setting; agents observe exogenous parameters      ,   ,  ,  ,   
T=0.1: Bargaining on c  
T=0.2: Vote on t  
T=1: Risk is realised, payoffs. 
The model will be solved by backward induction.
28
 
3.8.  Solving the model 
3.8.1. Vote on social assistance level    given the level of contribution c 
First- and second-order conditions yield: 
     
        
 
   
     {
  
 
                           ̅
      
 
 
Where  ̅ is the solution of    
   ̅     
It can easily be shown that SK is the median voter on   , so that the political outcome of the 
vote on social assistance, given    is: 
       
      
 
                                                 
28 The result of the model is obviously not independent of the order in which decisions are made. However, there 
is no structure-induced equilibrium: if decisions on c and on t are taken repeatedly, convergence will not happen. 
But admitting that the decision sequence is not infinite but restricted to a pair of decisions (one on c and the other 
on t), the timeline we propose (bargaining on c before voting on t) would be chosen by the majority over the 
alternative possibility (voting on t before bargaining on c): if firms and unions have a common interest in 
changing the level of c, they will prefer to do so before the level of t is set. Thus, they will support an agenda 
putting bargaining first. On the other hand, if they are against modifying the level of c, the result will not depend 
on the decision-making order. 
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3.8.2. Bargaining on social insurance between F and SK 
 
The bargaining on   takes place before the vote on   , so that everybody has preference over   
taking into account the future level of       . 
 
The value of    can thus be replaced by    
      in each utility function. 
 
           ∑(                    
     )           
 
 
             [   (                
     )]                     
       
 
Given this (computation in Appendix 7.1), one obtain this table of preferences of social 
partners in respect of the level of social contributions. In the following table, + means that the 
agent locally prefers
29
 an increase in c to obtain a cut in t.  
 
  
  
        
     
     
 
     
     
           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
 
     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅       
Firms + + - 
Unions - + + 
Outcome Frozen Bargaining on c possible Frozen 
 
Since   is a strictly decreasing function of a state’s ability to tax profit  , it becomes clear 
how a strong increase (or a strong decrease) in   precludes any bargaining on the level of 
social contributions, because firms’ and unions’ interests are no longer aligned. 
In such cases, one can expect the level of social contributions to remain constant (because one 
of the actors wants this to be the outcome) and any adjustment to the level of risk or change in 
the wage distribution to be set by an adjustment on the assistance side, i.e. a change in      
but not in c. 
Let        be the outcome of the bargaining between unions and firms on   . 
                                                 
29 Meaning for value of c belonging to [0;  ̅ . For value above  ̅ there is no longer a trade-off between assistance 
and insurance. 
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The political outcome of social protection is:
30
 
 
       
     
     
 
     
     
     
      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
 
     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅       
c              
t        
      0        
      
 Post corporatist Corporatist Universalist 
Thus, the type of equilibrium (corporatist or not) depends on     . 
3.9.  Conclusion of the model 
To summarise these result in words, given an initial mix in social protection        , the 
political response to any change in risk level/wage distribution/profit level will depend on a 
state’s ability to tax profit.  
 When the state can tax profit at a relative high rate, unions have no incentive to 
increase social insurance: the burden of assistance will be borne chiefly by profits, and 
workers (a coalition of skilled and unskilled) will be able to reach a majority to 
implement it. In the latter case, firms will veto any cut in social insurance, because 
maintaining a certain level of social insurance prevents unions from demanding 
additional assistance. 
 When capital mobility and/or tax competition strongly limits the ability of the state to 
tax profits, any increase in assistance will rely primarily on workers. In the latter case, 
firms will have no interest in negotiating an increase in social insurance; conversely, 
unions will oppose any cut in social insurance because substituting assistance for 
insurance will be costly for their constituency. However, if the level of existing social 
insurance is insufficient in respect of demand for social protection, unions will back an 
increase in assistance (as a feasible second best). 
 The corporatist compromise to manage demand for social protection by 
increasing/decreasing social insurance only happens when both unions and firms 
prefer social insurance to tax-funded assistance. Regardless of other determinants 
included in the model (risk level, risk distribution, wage distribution, profit-wage ratio, 
bargaining power of social partners), this is only possible when the ability to tax 
profits is high enough (so that firms have an incentive to make a deal with the unions), 
                                                 
30 Here again it is assumed that    belongs to [0;  ̅ . 
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but not excessively high (so that the unions cannot expect social protection to rely 
solely on the taxation of profits). 
 
Moreover, the model predicts that, all things being equal, a significant decrease in the state’s 
ability to tax profits is likely to break the compromise in a formerly Bismarckian country: 
social insurance will be frozen (but will not collapse), and any new social protection 
expenditure will be funded through a tax-based assistance scheme. This is the general trend 
observed in Bismarckian countries over recent years. 
The model also highlights an interesting dimension of social protection: the distinction 
between the preference for one scheme and the demand for a certain level of social protection. 
All agents have preferences for a certain type of arrangement to deal with social risk (social 
insurance or social assistance). But the preference for one scheme over the other and does not 
determine the absolute level of social insurance preferred by the agent. This offers an original 
explanation for the apparent paradox current in political economy: 
 -Firms absolutely prefer zero social protection but may support social insurance as 
opposed to social assistance, even if social insurance is more generous at the aggregate level.  
 -Skilled workers may absolutely prefer social insurance as opposed to social assistance 
(because of its less redistributive design), but simultaneously support an increase in social 
assistance (because an increase in social insurance is not achievable). 
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3.10. Discussion on the level of generality 
The model displayed here presents the case of a trade-off between earnings-related insurance 
and flat-rate-benefit models. It can thus be applied to several kinds of social risk, such as 
unemployment, old age or sick leave. It has a relatively high level of generality, since non-
contributors (unskilled in the model) are also entitled to insurance benefits, and as such it 
allows social insurance to operate cross-class redistribution. So, whereas it is generally 
admitted that universal coverage is a reason for unions to switch from social contributions to 
taxation, the model shows that this is not necessarily the case. Obviously, relaxing this 
assumption reinforces the bias of both firms and skilled workers in favour of insurance.  
The model does not however correspond to the representation of health insurance or other 
flat-rate-benefit schemes (e.g. family). For those schemes, the sole distinction between 
insurance and assistance will not be in the definition of benefits (earnings-related vs flat-rate 
benefit) but in coverage. In this case, the same mechanism as displayed above may only apply 
if I relax the assumption that insurance and assistance have the same coverage. Conversely, 
once it is accepted that health insurance provides universal coverage, the model gives no 
reason for unions to support funding through social contributions alone.  
4. Empirics 
I test the hypothesis that competition in respect of corporate taxation is a determinant of the 
funding structure of social protection.  
This hypothesis is first tested by using the growth rate of social security contributions as a 
dependent variable (DV). I then take the structure of social protection funding as DV (the 
share of social contribution in total social protection expenditure, called the “Bismarckian 
index”). In both cases, the model is first tested alone, then in competition with other 
theoretical explanations, by the progressive inclusion of corresponding controls. 
4.1. Data 
I use data provided by the OECD, except for the explanatory variable, which is provided by 
the Institute for Fiscal Studies (Devereux et al. [2002]). The sample includes nine countries 
(Belgium, Austria, France, Germany,
31
 Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Portugal), 
between 1980 and 2005. An average of 20 observations are made by country, the minimum 
                                                 
31 West Germany before 1991. 
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being 10 and the maximum being 25. The total sample includes 180 observations. I carried 
out regression control on the external validity of the argument by including non-Bismarckian 
countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Norway and the UK). 
Dependent variables 
Social contribution rate: defined as the total amount of social contributions (item 2000 in the 
OECD tax revenue statistics) divided by workers’ remuneration (“Compensation of 
Employees” in national accounts provided by the OECD). Because of the chosen model, this 
variable is expressed in first differences. In an alternative specification, I use the moving 
average over three periods of the growth rate as DV.
3233
 
  
                                                 
32 This is because this variable is very volatile: even in periods when the contribution rate increases fast, the rate 
does not necessarily change every year. The moving average is a means of capturing the average increase in the 
contribution rate, over a period of time, without focusing on the calendar year. The drawback is that the 
introduction of a moving average reinforces the autocorrelation of variables and errors. Yet the result displayed 
above does not depend on the choice of the DV (yearly variable or moving average). 
33 See appendix 7.4 for long term evolution of social security contributions, since 1965. 
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Figure II- 3: Change in social contribution rate in Bismarckian countries (% of labour cost) 
 
Rate of aggregate social contributions. Own calculation, OECD data. After a strong increase 
at the beginning of the period, the contribution rate appears to have reached a ceiling 
(Austria, Belgium, France
34
, Germany, Spain, Greece). 
The “Bismarckian index”:35 is defined as the share of social protection funded through social 
contributions. The index is straightforwardly computed as the ratio of total social security 
contributions paid (item 2000 in the OECD tax nomenclature) to total social public 
expenditure (OECD statistics). For France, this ratio includes an adjustment: to avoid a break 
due to a legal change, the portion of the CSG
36
 levied on wages is considered here as a social 
contribution (which is not the case in the OECD data). The variable is ultimately standardised 
in order to reduce the co-linearity with the interacted variable.  
Bismcoun: dummy taking value 1 for countries where the non-standardised Bismarckian 
index is higher than 0.5 on average, i.e. the nine Bismarckian countries of the sample. 
                                                 
34 The share of CSG levied on wages is included. 
35 This concept comes from Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007) where it has a slightly different sense: in their paper, 
the Bismarckian index accounts for the extent to which benefits are earnings-related. 
36 CSG: “contribution sociale généralisée”, flat tax levied on labour income, pensions and capital income. Since 
the share levied on labour income is very similar to a social contribution and since it has replaced formerly 
existing social contributions, a share of CSG is considered as social contribution in the data. 
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Figure II- 4: Share of social protection expenditure funded through social contributions 
 
Own calculation, OECD data. In almost all countries, there is a significant downward trend 
(not necessarily starting in 1980). For Austria the trend starts in 1999, observations on 
Greece are not sufficient to reach a conclusion. The Netherlands is clearly an outlier. 
Explanatory variable: 
EATRIFS is the effective average tax rate computed by the Institute for fiscal studies 
between 1980 and 2005. This is a “forward-looking” rate37 computed for manufacturing 
industry, taking into account the statutory corporate tax rate and the interest rate (for more 
details see Devereux et al. [2002]). This variable (close to the statutory corporate tax rate) is 
very sensitive to tax competition (Overesch and Rincke [2011], Genschel and Schwarz 
[2011]). The choice of a forward-looking tax rate seems the most appropriate to test the 
argument. First, because the statutory tax rate is much more sensitive to tax competition than 
the implicit tax rate computed ex-post, for an obvious reason: in a tax competition context, the 
country with the lowest corporate tax rate can attract profitable firms and obtain a high level 
of corporate tax revenue. Second, because the (constrained) decline in the EATR tax rate is a 
good proxy for the ability of the state to increase taxes on corporate profits: indeed, if a 
                                                 
37 i.e. computed ex-ante at a micro level. 
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country is forced to lower the corporate tax rate due to tax competition, the threat of a tax 
increase on profits disappears, even if social protection increases. In view of the argument 
presented above, firms lose their incentive to support social contributions (because such an 
increase would primarily be borne by labour). 
eatrbismcoun is the interacted variable between EATRIFS and the dummy bismcoun 
Figure II- 5: Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) on corporate profit 
 
The decrease of the effective average tax rate of corporate profit in manufacturing sector. 
Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Controls 
I control for two types of variables: i) an alternative variable related to globalisation (the trade 
side of it) that could also help explain change in the funding structure of social protection; and 
ii) domestic economic and demographic indicators that could also explain a change in the 
social protection funding structure, and the party in power.  
Extra: the openness rate of manufactured goods. This variable is defined as the sum of 
imported and exported goods per year, in points of GDP. This is a proxy for another 
dimension of globalisation: the internationalisation of trade.  
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Manulabcost: the unit labour cost in manufacturing. An excessively high labour cost in a 
sector exposed to international competition can be an incentive for the state to lower the 
burden on wages. A negative relationship between this variable and the DV is expected.  
Manufacturing: an OECD index of the share of the labour force working in the 
manufacturing sector. For several reasons, the importance of the manufacturing sector is 
associated with corporatism. The decline of manufacturing is a signal of the weakening of the 
corporatist arrangement, since employers of others sector may be less interested in supporting 
social contributions. The decline of manufacturing can also be a signal of the intensity of 
global competition, making pressure for cuts in non-wage labour costs in the tradable sector. 
Kaopen: an index of de jure financial openness computed by Chinn and Ito (2008). This 
variable is expected to have a negative impact on the social contribution rate and the 
Bismarckian index. It is also supposedly correlated with EATR, but whereas EATR is a proxy 
for the effective consequences of tax competition at a country level, kaopen is a legal 
measurement of capital mobility. 
Unemplrate: the unemployment rate provided by the OECD. An excessively high 
unemployment rate can be an incentive for certain actors to reduce labour taxation through 
social contributions.  
Senior: this variable accounts for the increase in social needs, be it for pensions or health 
expenditure. Together with unemployment, it also accounts for the share of inactive 
population. 
lrgovseats: is a new version
38
 of an index of government ideology from Amable, et al. (2006). 
It controls for the political orientation of the party in power. 
Growth: growth rate of total public social expenditure. 
CPI: the inflation rate. A high level of inflation is seen as favouring corporatism. 
Idreu: a dummy variable that accounts for the inclusion of East Germany in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
A last control is not included in main regressions because of a lack of observations (yearly 
observations unavailable): the share of health expenditure in total social protection 
                                                 
38 Provided by Thibault Darcillon. 
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expenditure. Indeed it has been argued in the literature that tax-revenue was more appropriate 
than social contributions to fund universal health expenditure. Thus an increase in the share of 
health expenditure within total social protection expenditure could explain the decline of 
social contributions in social protection funding.
39
 Regression displayed in appendix 7.2.3 
(Table AII- 17) on available data (around 40 observations) show that results displayed below 
are robust to the inclusion of the share of health expenditure. 
4.2. Method 
The structure of our data suggests use of time series cross-section methodology in order to 
obtain sufficient variance and a sufficient number of observations. For the general 
methodology, I follow Beck and Katz (1995 and 2009), and I use panel-corrected standard 
errors in each regression.  
I focus on the pattern of reform followed by each country (i.e. the variation “within” 
countries), as opposed to the absolute level of the dependent variable. This led me to choose a 
dynamic modelling of the DV. Following Beck and Katz (2009), and after running the 
appropriate tests, I chose a dynamic specification allowing for an autocorrelation at the first 
order. The first estimated equation is thus: 
                                                    40 
This specification uses the increase in the contribution rate as DV. In an alternative 
specification, this DV is smoothed over three periods. Because of the suspicion of non-
stationarity of some independent variables, the same regression is tested with the DV re-
expressed in second differences, while the explanatory variable is expressed in first 
differences. 
The second specification, using the Bismarckian index as DV, is an LDV model (lagged 
dependent variable), for obvious statistical reasons: it is more than likely that the Bismarckian 
index of one country will be persistent over time (as opposed to the precedent DV, which is 
expressed in first differences). But there is also a theoretical reason for using an LDV model: 
political decisions on social protection funding systematically refer to the status quo ex-ante, 
especially concerning corporatist social protection. The explicit debate is never about setting 
                                                 
39 Data on the evolution of social expenditure by risk are available in Appendix 7.6. 
40 The equation displayed here does not take into account the Prais-Winsten transformation used in the tested 
model. 
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social protection at a certain size, but always about raising or cutting it, more or less. The 
estimated relation is thus: 
                                               41 
In both specifications, the explanatory variable is expressed as a level: it is assumed that the 
level of the statutory corporate tax rate is a proxy for the intensity of tax competition. Thus, I 
do not expect a change in EATR to have only a transitory effect on corporatist social 
protection, but rather that the dynamism of corporatist social protection (the variation of the 
contribution rate, or the variation in the Bismarckian index) will depend on whether EATR is 
high or low. 
Fixed effect and Prais-Winsten transformation (because of first-order autoregressive error) are 
included when tests show them to be required (i.e. in most cases). 
Endogeneity issues are commonly raised in such econometrics; however, they do not appear 
to be a major concern here. First because the risk of reverse causality does not concern my 
main explanatory variable: the assumption that the corporate taxation is an exogenous factor 
(in the sense that it is not determined by the DV) is fairly reasonable and consistent with my 
theoretical framework. The risk of reverse causality is higher as far as some controls are 
concerned, especially labour cost and unemployment. Since I do not want specifically to 
interpret the coefficients of these controls, this issue is addressed simply by adding controls 
one by one, to be sure that the overall result does not come from the inclusion of one single 
variable associated with reverse causality. Ultimately, the sole real endogeneity issue is the 
assumption that corporate taxation level in each country is independent of the level of 
corporate taxation in other countries: we know from the literature mentioned above that the 
reduction of corporate taxation results from international tax competition. To take this into 
account among robustness checks, I instrumented the explanatory variable by its own lag and 
the lagged value of the average corporate tax rate (proxy of the intensity of tax competition). 
  
                                                 
41 Idem. 
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4.3. Results  
4.3.1. First regression: variation of the contribution rate as dependent variable 
In this first model, the DV is the variation of the contribution rate. The inclusion of a fixed 
effect corresponds to a country-specific trend, attributable to exogenous factors (increase in 
social demand, ageing, catch-up effect, etc.).  
In a first series of specifications, I test the interaction between my DV and the fact of the 
country being Bismarckian (Table 1). Whereas the coefficient of EATR is significant and 
negative when all countries are pooled together, the introduction of a regime dummy 
interacted with EATR stresses that the effect is only significant for the cluster of Bismarckian 
countries. 
Table II-  1: Contribution rate and EATR in all countries and interacted with Bismarckian countries (PCSE) 
 
I then test the regression on the cluster of Bismarckian countries alone, including the one-by-
one controls. All specifications include country dummies. Only the last specification includes 
year dummies. The auto-correlation coefficient of the error term is inferior to 0.25 for each 
specification.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                                                    
R-squared                   0.036           0.056           0.071   
Observations                  294             294             193   
                                                                    
                                          (0.012)                   
eatrbismcoun                               0.1000*                  
                          (0.091)         (0.011)                   
bismcoun                 -0.00672         -0.0252*                  
                          (0.004)         (0.874)         (0.002)   
EATR IFS                   0.0528**       0.00299           0.103** 
                                                                    
                     dcontribra~g    dcontribra~g    dcontribra~g   
                              (1)             (2)             (3)   
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Table II-  2: Variation of contribution rate and EATR in Bismarckian countries (PCSE) 
 
Fixed effects are included. p values (computed through PCSE) are indicated under coefficient. 
As expected, the explanatory variable EATR is positive and highly significant, meaning that 
more intense tax competition is correlated with slower (and possibly negative) growth in the 
contribution rate. According to the point estimate, the reduction of 10 points of corporate 
taxation would be associated with a reduction of 1 point per year in the increase in the 
contribution rate. The effect is thus consistent and significant. 
The only significant control would appear to be the political orientation of the party in power, 
right-wing parties being associated with an increase in the contribution rate. However, the 
absolute value of the party effect is too negligible to suggest a causal interpretation (the most 
right-wing government possible would raise the contribution rate by 0.1 point of social 
contributions per year). 
To conclude, neither of the controls related to an alternative explanation of social protection 
reform (extra, accounting for trade openness, and manufacturing, accounting for 
deindustrialisation) appears to be significant. Even in a specification from which my main 
explanatory variable (EATR IFS) is excluded, these variables remain insignificant.  
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                                                                                                                                  
R-squared            0.081        0.084        0.119        0.091        0.084        0.082        0.081        0.081        0.163        0.324   
Observations           193          193          182          193          193          193          193          193          182          182   
                                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                           (0.732)      (0.514)   
growth                                                                                                                    -0.00457       0.0254   
                                                                                                              (0.994)      (0.981)      (0.767)   
kaopen                                                                                                      -0.0000174    0.0000583    -0.000895   
                                                                                                 (0.738)                   (0.502)      (0.850)   
extra                                                                                           -0.00420                   -0.0125      0.00420   
                                                                                    (0.940)                                (0.225)      (0.492)   
manufacturing                                                                       0.00770                                 -0.147       -0.151   
                                                                       (0.677)                                             (0.929)      (0.291)   
salgrowth                                                              -0.0256                                            -0.00641       0.0891   
                                                          (0.457)                                                          (0.107)      (0.683)   
IPC                                                      0.000537                                                          0.00167    -0.000580   
                                             (0.038)                                                                       (0.008)      (0.006)   
lrgovseats                                  0.000197*                                                                     0.000239**   0.000251** 
                                (0.554)                                                                                    (0.427)      (0.493)   
Unemplrate                       0.0297                                                                                     0.0397       0.0463   
                                (0.748)                                                                                    (0.871)      (0.903)   
senior                          -0.0506                                                                                     0.0342      -0.0263   
                   (0.001)      (0.006)      (0.000)      (0.005)      (0.001)      (0.025)      (0.003)      (0.004)      (0.003)      (0.005)   
EATR IFS             0.113**      0.102**      0.137***     0.102**      0.117**      0.110*       0.110**      0.113**      0.150**      0.128** 
                                                                                                                                                  
                 dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g   
                       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)          (7)          (8)          (9)         (10)   
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4.3.2. Second regression: the Bismarckian index (the balance between contributions 
and other tax revenue) as DV 
Table II-  3: Bismarckian index (standardized) and EATR (PCSE with LDV) 
 
Fixed effects are included. p values (computed through PCSE) are indicated under coefficient. 
The DV used is the standardised Bismarckian index. The first column includes all the 
countries of the sample. The second tests the interaction effect between the Bismarckian 
regime and EATR. The last six columns are regressions on the subsample of Bismarckian 
countries alone. 
The positive relationship between the Bismarckian index and EATR is only significant for the 
subsample of Bismarckian countries. None of the controls included appears to be significant. 
4.4. Robustness checks  
4.4.1. Difference in the contribution rate as DV 
Since our controls do not modify the point estimate of the explanatory variable, and since the 
number of countries and observations is relatively low, certain robustness checks exclude 
controls to preserve a relatively high level of efficiency. 
The first concern is the non-stationarity of variables: it requires us to test whether the 
significance of explanatory variables is not spurious. The fact that the results are robust to the 
inclusion of year dummies (last column, table 2) or a trend in the regression should reinforce 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                                                                                                        
R-squared            0.969        0.971        0.915        0.918        0.918        0.914        0.920        0.926   
Observations           329          329          213          200          201          213          187          174   
                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                 (0.441)      (0.414)   
lrgovseats                                                                                      0.000526     0.000591   
                                                                                    (0.165)                   (0.279)   
manulabcost                                                                           0.136                    -0.199   
                                                                       (0.376)                                (0.666)   
manufacturing                                                            0.593                                 -0.357   
                                                          (0.286)                                             (0.675)   
extra                                                      -0.138                                             -0.0713   
                                             (0.664)                                                          (0.665)   
senior                                        -0.310                                                           -0.488   
                                             (0.099)                                                          (0.968)   
Unemplrate                                     0.756                                                           0.0180   
                                (0.000)                                                                                 
eatrbismcoun                      1.303***                                                                              
                   (0.000)      (0.002)                                                                                 
bismcoun             0.345***     0.193**                                                                               
                   (0.169)      (0.161)      (0.001)      (0.006)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)   
EATR IFS             0.250       -0.290        0.875***     0.867**      1.095***     1.182***     1.299***     1.359***
                   (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)   
lbismstd             0.747***     0.701***     0.705***     0.692***     0.686***     0.715***     0.697***     0.673***
                                                                                                                        
                 Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x   
                       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)          (7)          (8)   
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confidence in the estimated relation. Moreover, the re-estimate over a sub-period of time does 
not destabilise coefficients, which is a good sign (see Appendix 7.2.1 AII-2). Ultimately, the 
same model re-expressed in first differences (i.e. in second differences for the DV), confirms 
the significance of the explanatory variable
42
 (Appendix 7.2.1 AII-4). 
The inclusion of an auto-correlated structure of error (Prais-Winsten transformation) and the 
reasonable value of the rho coefficient of autocorrelation (below 0.25) provides a measure of 
confidence in the fact that the persistence of the DV does not drive the result. 
The second concern is the inclusion of country fixed effect. Statistically, tests support their 
use (they effect coefficients), and there is a priori no problem in using fixed effect in a model 
without a lagged DV. From a theoretical point of view, the use of country fixed effect in a 
model with a DV expressed in first differences corresponds to the inclusion of a specific trend 
for each country; this inclusion could be useful in taking into account unobserved factors, 
such as catch-up effects in countries with low social protection or an idiosyncratic trend 
towards increasing social contributions every year. Yet this trend modifies the interpretation 
of the coefficient of the explanatory variable: the EATR effect corresponds to variations 
relative to the trend (see for instance Plümper et al. [2005]). The exclusion of this fixed effect 
(i.e. making the assumption that the default value of the DV is 0) modifies the point estimate 
(Table 4), but the sign and the significance of the explanatory variable remain unaffected. 
Ultimately, the last concern comes from the assumption of homogeneous coefficients across 
countries: if the heterogeneity is too strong, the risk is that one single outlier can drive the 
result. This concern is addressed by using methodologies relaxing the assumption of a 
homogeneous coefficient. The first is from Pesaran and Smith (1995) and computes a 
weighted average coefficient country by country (see Appendix 7.2 Table AII-5). I do not see 
a theoretical reason why errors could be correlated across sections, however Pesaran’s test of 
cross-section independence (Pesaran [2006]) is rejected, and the results are not robust to the 
inclusion of a cross-sectional random component. The second methodology is a maximum-
likelihood estimation of coefficients including a fixed and a random (country-specific) 
component as advocated by Beck and Katz (2007). Both tests lead us to conclude that the 
coefficient of the explanatory variable is positive and significant.  
                                                 
42 I nonetheless prefer to display the explanatory variable in level since, from a theoretical point of view, a model 
in first difference only accounts for short-term variations. 
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I also run cross-validation, by dropping countries one by one in the regression. It turns out 
that Italy is the biggest outlier, i.e. the country where the effect is the strongest. Ultimately, I 
run a simple PCSE regression allowing country-specific coefficients (Appendix 7.1.1 Table 
AII-8). Robustness tests lead to the conclusion that the explanatory variable EATR is 
significant at the 10% level, and that country-specific estimates support a positive relationship 
for all countries except Portugal. However, the effect of EATR is probably weaker than in the 
first estimate (roughly 0.06, as opposed to 0.11), with the main estimate driven by Italy. The 
results are fairly robust to the instrumentation of the DV (Table 4 and detailed results in 
Appendix 7.1.1 Table  AII-9). The instrumentation seems appropriate according to usual tests 
(Appendix 7.1.1 Table  AII-10). The only issue raised is that manufacturing and instrumented 
EATR are not jointly significant (last column of Table 4), probably due to co-linearity; 
however EATR alone has much better explanatory power than manufacturing. 
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Table II-  4: Recapitulative table of results - difference of contribution rate as DV 
Dependent 
variable   d.contribution rate 
Estimation   
OLS 
PCSE 
AR1 
(FE) 
OLS 
PCSE 
AR1 
(FE) 
OLS 
PCSE 
AR1 
(FE) 
OLS 
PCSE 
AR1 
(FE) 
OLS 
PCSE 
AR1 
(FE) 
OLS 
PCSE 
AR1 
Mean 
group 
estimator, 
outlier 
robust  
Random 
coefficient, 
Maximum 
likelihood 
estimator 
IV-2SLS 
(Heteroscedastic) 
IV-2SLS 
(Heteroscedastic) 
Coefficient 
of EATR   0.113 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.128 0.117 0.086 0.053 0.089 0.079 
p-value   0.001 0.001 0.003 0.071 0.005 0.011 0.059 0.006 0.004 0.214 
                        
                        
Controls   No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Country 
fixed 
effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
dummy   No No No No Yes No No No No No 
idreu   Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes     Yes Yes 
Italy 
excluded   No Yes No Yes No No     No No 
AR1   0.232 0.258 0.166 0.143 0.095 0.226 No 0.122 No No 
                        
T   25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
N   9 8 8 7 8 8 9 9 9 8 
Obs   193 168 182 158 182 182 193 193 191 180 
R2   0.081 0.055 0.163 0.172 0.324 0.11     0.095 0.17 
 
4.4.2. The Bismarckian index as DV 
The concerns here are the same as for the first regression (non-stationarity): autocorrelation of 
errors and homogeneity of coefficients across countries. One additional concern comes from 
the specifications of the model, namely that it includes an LDV and fixed effect, since 
Plümper et al. (2005) cast doubt on the joint use of LDV and fixed effect (in contradiction to 
what they call the “Beck and Katz standard”), going so far as to advocate the use of simple 
Prais-Winsten transformation in preference to the inclusion of an LDV. Moreover, the use of 
an LDV introduces a “Nickel Bias” in the coefficient (but makes the estimator more 
consistent). I therefore test the model, removing either the fixed effect or the LDV. The sign 
and significance of the explanatory variable is not importantly modified (see Appendix 7.2.2 
Tables AII- 10 and AII- 11). However (this is not a surprise in view of the explanation 
contained in Plümper et al. [2005]), controls are more significant when the LDV is removed: 
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unemployment rate, the proportion of seniors in relation to the population and the 
manufacturing labour cost have significant and negative coefficients. 
The results are robust to the inclusion of a year dummy, and to the inclusion of a random 
component in coefficients. A cross-validation shows that Italy is again a strong outlier: the 
results are not robust to the exclusion of Italy as long as it includes an LDV. Removing Italy 
reduces the value of the EATR coefficient, but it remains positive (see Appendix A11). 
Specifications allowing heterogeneity in coefficients (Mean Group Estimator from Pesaran 
and Smith (1995) and Random Coefficient Estimator) tend to confirm the sign and the 
estimate range of the explanatory variable. The results are also robust to the instrumentation 
of the DV (see Table 5). 
Table II-  5: Recapitulative table of results  (Bismarckian index as DV) 
Dependent 
variable   Standardized Bismarckian index 
Estimation   
OLS 
PCSE 
LDV 
(FE) 
OLS 
PCSE 
LDV 
(FE) 
OLS 
PCSE 
LDV 
(FE) 
OLS 
PCSE 
LDV 
(FE) 
OLS 
PCSE 
LDV 
OLS 
PCSE 
AR1 
(FE) 
OLS 
PCSE 
AR1 
(FE) 
Mean 
group 
estimator, 
outlier 
robust 
coeff 
Random 
coefficient, 
Maximum 
likelihood 
estimator 
IV-2SLS 
(Hetero-
scedastic) 
IV-2SLS 
(Hetero-
scedastic) 
Coefficient 
of EATR   0.875 0.774 1.24 1.45 1.08 1.264 
-
0.681 0.775 0.964 1 0.943 
p-value   0.001 0.004 0 0 0.002 0.026 0.266 0.114 0 0 0.097 
                          
LDV   0.705 0.719 0.664 0.637 0.799 No No 0.719 0.737 0.689 0.677 
Controls   No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Country 
Fixed 
Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
dummy   No No No Yes No No No No No No No 
idreu   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Italy 
excluded   No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No 
AR1   No No No No No 0.653 0.556 No No No   
                          
T   25 25 25 25 25 26 26 25 25 25 25 
N   9 8 8 8 8 8 7 9 9 9 8 
Obs   213 188 174 174 174 181 156 213 213 211 172 
R2   0.915 0.92 0.927 0.942 0.919 0.662 0.765     0.701 0.715 
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4.5. Discussion 
In spite of having a relatively small sample of countries and a limited number of observations, 
the results show that a synchronicity exists between the reduction of corporate taxation and 
the decline in the Bismarckian funding of social protection. Although not spectacular (see 
Figure 6 below), this synchronicity is stronger than a simple common trend between two 
distinct phenomena: both processes occur at different periods of time but are correlated in 
most Bismarckian countries. Moreover, none of the concurrent explanations found in the 
literature (trade openness, decline in manufacturing, labour cost, etc.) makes a better 
contribution to explaining the variation of the DV than my explanatory variable. Robustness 
checks tend to validate this relationship, but to moderate its estimate (whereas the point 
estimate in the first regression is 0.11, checks shows that 0.05 seems to be a more likely 
value). The meaning is that a decline of 10 points of effective corporate taxation reduces the 
variation of the contribution rate by 0.5 points of contribution per year. Among our country 
sample, the average variation of the contribution rate was +1 points per year between 1980 
and 1985, and +0.1 point per year between 2000 and 2005. So up to half of this deceleration 
could be ascribed to the indirect political effect of the decline of corporate taxation. 
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Figure II- 6: Co-variation of EATR and difference in contribution rate 
 
Standardised value of the annual variation of contribution rate and of EATR 
5. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a new theoretical explanation of the unexpected emergence of a model 
mixing insurance and assistance in Bismarckian countries. To summarise, whereas the level 
of social protection expenditure has kept growing, the social contribution rate has been 
virtually frozen at a point in time (varying from one country to another). Surprisingly enough, 
there was no massive shift in social contribution revenue to other taxes: the biggest change in 
social protection funding structure was attributable to increases in budgetary expenditure, not 
the collapse of social security contributions.  
I argue that this change can be traced back to change in economic interests among social 
partners: whereas the level of social protection expenditure is driven by social demand, its 
funding (and it in turn the greater or lesser focus on insurance or assistance in its design) 
depends on the strategic interaction between economic and political actors. As long as unions’ 
bargaining power was backed by the credible threat of taxing profit at a high rate, firms had a 
strong incentive to support the Bismarckian compromise and to prefer social insurance to 
universal assistance. Let us be clear that it is not assumed here that firms used to support 
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social insurance for itself (as it is sometimes claimed in the variety of capitalism literature, 
e.g. Estevez-Abe et al. [2001]), but they supported it as the best possible alternative in a 
constrained context.  
Globalisation precisely changed this context. First, in the discourse, salient issues such as the 
high level of unemployment or the fear of relocation gave arguments to support supply-side 
policies: public debate on social protection funding permanently underlined the fact that any 
option would work as a disincentive for investment.
43
 But beyond these elements, probably 
the most important change has in fact been the decreasing ability of governments to tax the 
profits of multinational firms, because of tax competition and increasing financial openness. 
Given this new context, employers’ associations have defected from the historical 
compromise of funding social protection through social contributions levied on wages.  
This analysis may contribute to existing literature in several ways. First it tends to show that, 
as expected by scholars in the 1990s, tax competition triggered institutional reform and had 
distributive consequences. But contrary to what was expected, it did not immediately entail a 
collapse in social protection expenditure. Instead, it led to a search for a new tax base 
(household capital, income and consumption) to fund new benefits, and in turn to complement 
existing social insurance by assistance schemes (because it was impossible to increase the 
scope of insurance).
44
 
Second, it stresses that political economy modelling of social protection should pay attention 
to the coexistence between insurance and assistance to cover the same risk. Indeed, even in 
the simple model presented above, it is shown that the political interactions between insurance 
and assistance may be of a different nature: choosing between insurance and assistance not 
only implies the choice between more or less generous or redistributive benefits, it also 
implies the choice of a tax base, which is likely to have major distributive consequences, not 
only between workers, but also between capital and labour. Moreover, the political attitude of 
individuals in respect of one scheme (insurance or assistance) may be modified or 
manipulated by modifying another scheme. For instance, support for an earnings-related 
scheme (pensions or unemployment) among low-wage workers may vary as a function of the 
                                                 
43 An illustration of this discourse one can be found in a column by Bourdieu (1996) and a quote from former 
Bundesbank chairman Hans Tietmeyer: “The challenge today is to create the conditions for sustainable growth 
and investor confidence. We must therefore control government budgets, reduce the level of taxes to bring them 
to a sustainable long-term level and social protection systems.” 
44 Appendix 7.3 propose a decomposition of budgetary social expenditure by type of tax base and type of 
taxation. 
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generosity of the assistance covering the same risk. Conversely, since nobody wants to pay 
twice for the same risk, the presence of social insurance covering a large share of the 
population may be an obstacle to the implementation of an assistance scheme targeted on the 
poor (witness so-called “Obamacare”). 
Ultimately, it adds support to the claim that the politics of social protection in Bismarckian 
countries cannot be addressed properly if the governance mechanism of the various schemes 
is not addressed. Whereas this has been widely documented in qualitative political science 
literature, this dimension is generally overlooked by formal and quantitative analysis, in 
which social security expenditure is generally not distinguished from other forms of tax and 
transfers.  
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7. Appendices 
7.1. Model   
7.1.1. Cost-sharing of taxation when funding flat-rate or earnings-related benefits 
In this appendix, I endogenise the cost-sharing of labour taxation between firms and workers. 
The basic idea is that the share of tax that is perceived as an expected benefit is entirely borne 
by the employee  . The remaining part (the “deadweight loss”, or the distortive share of 
taxation) is shared between the employer and employees, in accordance with their relative 
bargaining power   .    takes a value of between 0 and 1, 1 being the case where the relative 
bargaining power of the employer is infinite. 
a/The cost of taxation funding earnings-related benefits (i.e. social security contributions) 
Distortive share: 
The distortive share is the share of taxation that is not perceived as funding expected benefits. 
For the individual   it is: 
                                        
share of   borne by worker  : 
                                
it yields: 
   
           
      
    
is the share of social security contributions supported by worker   
b/Taxation funding of flat-rate benefits (taxes) 
 
Deadweight loss: 
                                    
share of   borne by worker  : 
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It yields: 
   
           
        
    
with 
  
       
     
           
thus, 
   
                   
         
    
Comment: 
When the ability to tax profit   increases, the share of labour taxation borne by labour also 
increases (because the expected benefits increase). Indirectly, this is a channel through which 
a share of profit taxation is shifted back to workers. 
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c/Taxation funding of flat-rate benefits (taxes) re-expressed with the help of   and t’ 
 
  
   
  
 
     
         
 
 
     
         
       
    
   
       
 
     is thus a decreasing function of  : when the ability to tax profits increases, the distortion 
of labour taxation decreases (because the amount of the expected benefit increases). 
d/ Important comment 
It is possible for    or    to have a value higher than 1: if the expected benefit is higher than 
the taxation levied on the wage, an increase in taxation (and the expected benefit) can entail a 
decline in labour cost. To put it differently, theoretically, there is no reason why a distortion 
of the labour cost due to taxation can only raise the labour cost. Most probably, it is likely to 
raise the labour cost of some workers and lower that of others (those who are included in the 
scheme but whose wages are taxed less than their expected benefit).  
7.1.2. Model: Preferences of skilled workers and firms in respect of c 
Preference of skilled workers in respect of social insurance: 
          (     
     ) 
    (     
     )
  
 
             
                     
 
and the preference of SK in respect of   is given by 
    (     
     )
  
   ⇔  
     
     
 
SK prefers to increase the level of social insurance (and decrease the level of social 
assistance) as long as   is higher than 
     
     
. 
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Notably the sign of 
    (      )
  
 does not depends on   45 Put differently, skilled workers either 
prefer a pure assurance or a pure assistance equilibrium. An outcome in which insurance and 
assistance coexist can only be reached as a second best. 
Preference of firms in respect of social insurance: 
               
  
                    
      
  
          
               
  
 is constant in respect of c and continuous in respect of c=(0;1). 
That is to say that firms also prefer a pure insurance or a pure assistance solution, according to 
the sign of 
               
  
. 
This sign varies over the value of  : 
      (   
    )
 
     
              [
       
   
          ]    
Thus 
               
  
 continuously decreases over  , as long as    . 
By computing values of 
               
  
 for different values of   46 it can be shown that: 
    ̅                 
      (   
    )
  
  ̅    
and  
   ̅  
     
     
 
  
                                                 
45 At least as long as       
     , i.e. as long as there is a possible trade-off between c and t. 
46 Limit in 0+, in 
     
     
 and in 1 
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7.2. Robustness checks and additional econometrics 
7.2.1. First estimate 
Table AII-  1: With and without the explanatory variable 
 
Robustness checks: 
Table AII-  2: Re-estimate over a sub-time period (replication of Table 2, column 1) 
 
 Fixed effect and Paris-Winsten transformation included. 
The first column of table AII-2 is an estimate between 1980 and 1992, the second between 
1993 and 2005, and the third over the entire timeframe.  
Table AII-  3: Replication of Table 2 without country fixed effect 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                                    
R-squared                   0.012           0.081   
Observations                  235             193   
                                                    
                                          (0.001)   
EATR IFS                                    0.113** 
                                                    
                     dcontribra~g    dcontribra~g   
                              (1)             (2)   
                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                                       
R-squared            0.110        0.086        0.081   
Observations            82          111          193   
                                                       
                   (0.024)      (0.057)      (0.010)   
idreu              0.00613*     -0.0158      0.00872*  
                   (0.017)      (0.086)      (0.001)   
EATR IFS             0.155*       0.109        0.113** 
                                                       
                 dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g   
                       (1)          (2)          (3)   
                                                       
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                                                                                                                                  
R-squared            0.032        0.035        0.055        0.049        0.032        0.032        0.037        0.040        0.109        0.285   
Observations           193          193          182          193          193          193          193          193          182          182   
                                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                           (0.533)      (0.619)   
growth                                                                                                                    -0.00847       0.0203   
                                                                                                              (0.397)      (0.388)      (0.358)   
kaopen                                                                                                       -0.00155     -0.00180     -0.00266   
                                                                                                 (0.353)                   (0.144)      (0.199)   
extra                                                                                           -0.00458                  -0.00782     -0.00584   
                                                                                    (0.981)                                (0.121)      (0.215)   
manufacturing                                                                       0.00120                                 -0.120       -0.104   
                                                                       (0.828)                                             (0.703)      (0.353)   
salgrowth                                                               0.0111                                             -0.0215       0.0737   
                                                          (0.246)                                                          (0.194)      (0.751)   
IPC                                                      0.000740                                                          0.00127    -0.000465   
                                             (0.131)                                                                       (0.025)      (0.020)   
lrgovseats                                  0.000143                                                                      0.000210*    0.000200*  
                                (0.194)                                                                                    (0.796)      (0.535)   
Unemplrate                       0.0286                                                                                   -0.00642      -0.0162   
                                (0.942)                                                                                    (0.535)      (0.466)   
senior                         -0.00787                                                                                     0.0795        0.123   
                   (0.008)      (0.005)      (0.003)      (0.008)      (0.008)      (0.088)      (0.006)      (0.009)      (0.011)      (0.041)   
EATR IFS            0.0564**     0.0586**     0.0718**     0.0528**     0.0565**     0.0556       0.0575**     0.0533**      0.117*      0.0877*  
                                                                                                                                                  
                 dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g   
                       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)          (7)          (8)          (9)         (10)   
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Table AII-  4: replication in first differences 
 
Table AII-  5: Allowing heterogeneous coefficients 
 
The first column of table AII- 5 is the estimate of the weighted average coefficient from 
Pesaran and Smith (1995). The last two columns correspond to the restricted maximum 
likelihood estimator of coefficients (xtmixed under stata), allowing a random component and 
Prais-Winsten transformation. 
Table AII-  6: Re-estimate by dropping countries one by one (cross-validation) 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                          
R-squared            0.050        0.145   
Observations           184          173   
                                          
                   (0.713)      (0.607)   
Constant          0.000498      0.00141   
                                (0.114)   
D.growth                        -0.0210   
                                (0.468)   
D.kaopen                        0.00336   
                                (0.080)   
D.extra                         -0.0764   
                                (0.948)   
D.manufacturing                 -0.0333   
                                (0.177)   
D.salgrowth                       0.106   
                                (0.642)   
D.IPC                          0.000635   
                                (0.040)   
D.lrgovseats                   0.000229*  
                                (0.203)   
D.Unemplrate                      0.147   
                                (0.730)   
D.senior                         -0.198   
                   (0.012)      (0.001)   
D.EATR IFS           0.191*       0.242***
                                          
                 D.dcont~g    D.dcont~g   
                       (1)          (2)   
                                          
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                                            
R-sq                                                        
N                     193             193             294   
                                                            
                                                  (0.058)   
eatrbismcoun                                       0.0472   
                                                  (0.055)   
bismcoun                                          -0.0137   
                  (0.059)         (0.006)         (0.589)   
eatrifs            0.0858          0.0526**       0.00861   
main                                                        
                                                            
             dcontribra~g    dcontribra~g    dcontribra~g   
                      (1)             (2)             (3)   
                                                            
                               
442.         Spain   .1723644  
410.      Portugal     .17482  
346.   Netherlands   .1259265  
314.    Luxembourg   .1699848  
282.        Italie   .1079172  
                               
218.         Grèce   .1699848  
186.       Germany   .2011465  
154.        France    .217418  
 58.      Belgique   .1748242  
 26.       Austria   .1734394  
                               
           country       coef  
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Coefficients of Table AII- 6 correspond to the PCSE estimate, including all controls when 
dropping one country. Dropping France raises the estimate, whereas dropping Italy leads to a 
weaker coefficient. 
Table AII-  7 : PCSE with country-specific and uncorrelated coefficients, fixed effect and Prais-Winsten 
transformation included 
 
The level of significance is weak (the number of observations by country varies between 10 
and 25). The sole country for which the estimated coefficient is negative is Portugal (only 12 
observations). 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                    
R-squared                   0.073   
Observations                  294   
                                    
                          (0.010)   
eatrSP                     0.0990*  
                          (0.179)   
eatrPT                    -0.0474   
                          (0.021)   
eatrNOR                    0.0335*  
                          (0.077)   
eatrIT                      0.220   
                          (0.765)   
eatrGR                     0.0398   
                          (0.101)   
eatrGER                    0.0493   
                          (0.728)   
eatrFR                     0.0230   
                          (0.000)   
eatrBE                      0.188***
                          (0.439)   
eatrAU                     0.0131   
                                    
                     dcontribra~g   
                              (1)   
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Table AII-  8: Instrumented variable  
 
EATR is here instrumented by all variables plus l.eatrifs and l.eatrmean (lagged value of the 
average EATR across countries). Fixed effect is included but Prais-Winsten transformation is 
not. p values are robust to heteroscedasticity.  
The instrumentation tests (displayed below here for the first column) support the assumption 
that the instruments are strong enough and appropriately identified. The test for each column 
leads to comparable conclusions. 
 
Table AII-  9: Tests of validity of the instrumentation 
 
 
The point estimate is weaker than without instrumentation, but positive and stable. eatrifs and 
manufacturing are not significant together (probably because of a collinearity higher than 
0.4). However regression of the DV on manufacturing alone and EATR alone show that the 
explanatory variable of EATR is much higher than the explanatory power of manufacturing 
(R2 of 0.10 vs R2 of 0.04).  
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                                                                                                                     
R-squared            0.095        0.098        0.123        0.110        0.097        0.091        0.094        0.094        0.171   
Observations           191          191          180          191          191          191          191          191          180   
                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                           (0.957)   
growth                                                                                                                   -0.000510   
                                                                                                              (0.574)      (0.945)   
kaopen                                                                                                      -0.000901     0.000118   
                                                                                                 (0.392)                   (0.594)   
extra                                                                                           -0.00932                  -0.00631   
                                                                                    (0.348)                                (0.967)   
manufacturing                                                                        0.0845                                0.00560   
                                                                       (0.813)                                             (0.464)   
salgrowth                                                              -0.0132                                             -0.0622   
                                                          (0.112)                                                          (0.018)   
IPC                                                      0.000770                                                          0.00167*  
                                             (0.037)                                                                       (0.019)   
lrgovseats                                  0.000149*                                                                     0.000206*  
                                (0.550)                                                                                    (0.801)   
Unemplrate                       0.0284                                                                                     0.0131   
                                (0.293)                                                                                    (0.885)   
senior                           -0.117                                                                                     0.0186   
                   (0.004)      (0.177)      (0.004)      (0.044)      (0.015)      (0.332)      (0.031)      (0.077)      (0.214)   
EATR IFS            0.0887**     0.0605       0.0994**     0.0729*      0.0908*      0.0561       0.0788*      0.0781       0.0788   
                                                                                                                                     
                 dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g    dcontri~g   
                       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)          (7)          (8)          (9)   
                                                                                                                                     
                                                                              
Excluded instruments: L.eatrifs L.eatrmean
Included instruments: idreu
Instrumented:         eatrifs
                                                                              
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.6659
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.186
                                                                              
NB: Critical values are for Cragg-Donald F statistic and i.i.d. errors.
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).  Reproduced by permission.
                                         25% maximal IV size              7.25
                                         20% maximal IV size              8.75
                                         15% maximal IV size             11.59
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size             19.93
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):        215.723
                                                                              
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             62.961
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7.2.2.  Second estimate 
Table AII-  10: Replication of Table 3 without fixed effect 
 
 
 
Table AII-  11: Replication of Table 3 without LDV. Fixed effect and Prais-Winsten transformation are included 
 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                                                                                                        
R-squared            0.964        0.965        0.896        0.900        0.904        0.901        0.903        0.919   
Observations           329          329          213          200          201          213          187          174   
                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                 (0.437)      (0.315)   
lrgovseats                                                                                      0.000550     0.000728   
                                                                                    (0.193)                   (0.859)   
IPC                                                                                -0.00526                   0.00125   
                                                                                    (0.601)                   (0.165)   
manulabcost                                                                          0.0628                     0.220   
                                                                       (0.004)                                (0.022)   
manufacturing                                                           -0.804**                               -1.615*  
                                                          (0.312)                                             (0.002)   
extra                                                      0.0315                                              -0.135** 
                                             (0.299)                                                          (0.004)   
senior                                        -0.684                                                           -2.748** 
                                             (0.182)                                                          (0.831)   
Unemplrate                                     0.272                                                           0.0625   
                                (0.062)                                                                                 
eatrbismcoun                      0.289                                                                                 
                   (0.004)      (0.963)                                                                                 
bismcoun            0.0867**    0.00253                                                                                 
                   (0.236)      (0.867)      (0.113)      (0.046)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.014)      (0.002)   
EATR IFS             0.133       0.0200        0.250        0.324*       0.758***     0.552***     0.404*       1.083** 
                   (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)   
lbismstd             0.918***     0.921***     0.905***     0.921***     0.901***     0.914***     0.929***     0.799***
                                                                                                                        
                 Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x   
                       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)          (7)          (8)   
                                                                                                                        
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                                                                                                        
R-squared            0.716        0.759        0.587        0.554        0.583        0.554        0.595        0.662   
Observations           342          342          221          208          208          221          194          181   
                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                 (0.477)      (0.410)   
lrgovseats                                                                                      0.000719     0.000774   
                                                                                    (0.908)                   (0.304)   
IPC                                                                                0.000810                   -0.0119   
                                                                                    (0.002)                   (0.037)   
manulabcost                                                                          -0.949**                  -0.871*  
                                                                       (0.001)                                (0.899)   
manufacturing                                                            3.965***                              -0.201   
                                                          (0.923)                                             (0.777)   
extra                                                     -0.0276                                              0.0943   
                                             (0.000)                                                          (0.032)   
senior                                        -7.993***                                                        -5.780*  
                                             (0.097)                                                          (0.043)   
Unemplrate                                    -1.463                                                           -1.521*  
                                (0.000)                                                                                 
eatrbismcoun                      1.860***                                                                              
                   (0.000)      (0.409)                                                                                 
bismcoun             0.657***     0.142                                                                                 
                   (0.003)      (0.739)      (0.076)      (0.000)      (0.013)      (0.013)      (0.000)      (0.026)   
EATR IFS             0.945**      0.125        0.810        1.777***     1.165*       1.129*       2.288***     1.264*  
                                                                                                                        
                 Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x   
                       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)          (7)          (8)   
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Table AII-  12: Replication of Table 3, column 8, with (first column) and without (second column) year dummies 
 
Table AII-  13: Allowing heterogeneous coefficients 
 
The first column is the estimate of the weighted average coefficient from Pesaran and Smith 
(1995). The second column corresponds to the restricted maximum likelihood estimator of 
coefficients (xtmixed under stata), allowing a random component. 
Table AII-  14: Re-estimate by dropping countries one by one 
 
coef corresponds to the model with LDV and fixed effect, coef2 to the model without fixed 
effect. coef3 is the model without LDV and FE with AR1. Italy is a strong outlier. The effect 
is only robust to the exclusion of Italy from the sample in the third specification (the one 
advocated by Plümper et al. [2005]).  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                                    
R-squared                   0.927           0.942   
Observations                  174             174   
                                                    
                          (0.291)         (0.814)   
IPC                      -0.00897         0.00281   
                          (0.130)         (0.063)   
manulabcost                -0.322          -0.722   
                          (0.880)         (0.060)   
manufacturing               0.144          -2.770   
                          (0.867)         (0.051)   
extra                     -0.0285           0.319   
                          (0.400)         (0.015)   
senior                     -1.032           5.545*  
                          (0.622)         (0.012)   
Unemplrate                 -0.204          -1.920*  
                          (0.564)         (0.169)   
lrgovseats               0.000421         0.00109   
                          (0.000)         (0.000)   
EATR IFS                    1.245***        1.145***
                          (0.000)         (0.000)   
lbismstd                    0.664***        0.637***
                                                    
                     Standardiz~x    Standardiz~x   
                              (1)             (2)   
                                                    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                            
R-sq                                        
N                     213             213   
                                            
                  (0.114)         (0.000)   
eatrifs             0.775           0.965***
                  (0.000)         (0.000)   
lbismstd            0.717***        0.737***
main                                        
                                            
                  bismstd         bismstd   
                      (1)             (2)   
                                            
                                                     
442.         Spain   1.379098   1.324765   1.977418  
410.      Portugal   1.174087   1.085166   1.509646  
346.   Netherlands   1.204839   1.016783    1.74649  
314.    Luxembourg   1.245103   1.082631   1.640087  
282.        Italie   .0034481   .6524515   1.225964  
                                                     
218.         Grèce   1.245103   1.082631   1.640087  
186.       Germany   1.406429   1.624509   2.003787  
154.        France   1.790938   1.511096   2.335229  
 58.      Belgique   1.314301   1.050859   1.605897  
 26.       Austria   1.306505   .9916064   1.557602  
                                                     
           country       coef      coef2      coef3  
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Table AII-  15: Instrumented variable 
 
EATR is here instrumented by all variable plus l.eatrifs (lagged value of  EATR) and 
l.eatrmean (lagged value of the average EATR across countries). Fixed effect is included but 
Prais-Winsten transformation is not. p values are robust to heteroscedasticity.  
 
Table AII-  16: Test of validity of instruments (first column case) 
 
7.2.3. Inclusion of the share of health expenditure in social protection expenditure 
 
Table AII-  17: Variation of contribution rate and Bismarckian index (with LDV) and EATR, when the share of 
health expenditure is included (OLS with fixed-effect) 
 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                                                                                                                     
R-squared            0.701        0.706        0.726        0.707        0.672        0.716        0.660        0.702        0.715   
Observations           211          211          185          211          198          199          199          211          172   
                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                           (0.111)   
growth                                                                                                                      -0.174   
                                                                                                              (0.622)      (0.743)   
kaopen                                                                                                        0.00629     -0.00626   
                                                                                                 (0.140)                   (0.916)   
extra                                                                                             -0.168                   -0.0129   
                                                                                    (0.227)                                (0.873)   
manufacturing                                                                         0.853                                 -0.209   
                                                                       (0.832)                                             (0.133)   
salgrowth                                                               0.0827                                               1.080   
                                                          (0.066)                                                          (0.120)   
IPC                                                      -0.00601                                                          -0.0113   
                                             (0.424)                                                                       (0.114)   
lrgovseats                                  0.000551                                                                       0.00121   
                                (0.085)                                                                                    (0.432)   
Unemplrate                        0.759                                                                                      0.343   
                                (0.616)                                                                                    (0.247)   
senior                           -0.501                                                                                     -1.672   
                   (0.000)      (0.020)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.047)      (0.001)      (0.038)      (0.001)      (0.097)   
EATR IFS             1.009***     0.785*       1.310***     1.281***     0.806*       1.013**      0.782*       1.085***     0.943   
                                                                                                                                     
                 Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x    Standar~x   
                       (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)          (7)          (8)          (9)   
                                                                                                                                     
                                                                              
Excluded instruments: L.eatrifs L.eatrmean
Included instruments: lbismstd idreu
Instrumented:         eatrifs
                                                                              
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.4116
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.674
                                                                              
NB: Critical values are for Cragg-Donald F statistic and i.i.d. errors.
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).  Reproduced by permission.
                                         25% maximal IV size              7.25
                                         20% maximal IV size              8.75
                                         15% maximal IV size             11.59
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size             19.93
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):        371.040
                                                                              
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             48.460
                                                                              
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
p-values in parentheses
                                          
R-squared            0.132        0.572   
Observations            39           43   
                                          
                   (0.127)      (0.292)   
Constant           -0.0759       -0.552   
                                (0.001)   
L.Standardized~x                  0.516***
                   (0.700)      (0.582)   
idreu              0.00519      -0.0983   
                   (0.329)      (0.373)   
sharehealth          0.140        1.479   
                   (0.056)      (0.054)   
EATR IFS             0.133        1.504   
                                          
                 dcontri~g    Standar~x   
                       (1)          (2)   
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7.3. Who pays for the expansion of tax-funded social security in 
Bismarckian country? 
Analytically one cannot determine straightforward who pays for the expansion of tax-funded 
social security. In contrary to social contributions, most of tax-receipts are not earmarked; 
some of earmarked taxes were earmarked a posteriori, i.e. many years after their 
implementation. Consequently all kinds of taxes contribute to fund tax-funded social security. 
Moreover the increase in tax-funded social security receipts is weakly correlated to the 
general evolution of tax receipts (correlation coefficient of 0.25 in average). Hence one cannot 
directly link the size of government’s budget and social security expansion: a significant share 
of social security is funded not only by new taxes but through cuts in other public expenses. 
To determine the tax base of the expansion of social security, I consider it as a standard 
budgetary expansion paid by the average tax-payer. I used OECD data of tax structure. 
 
7.3.1. Average contribution of Corporation, Households and Consumption to 
variation in social protection 
 
Following OECD (2001) I compute an indicator of the relative share of taxation relying on 
households, corporation and consumption. On this basis I computed the cost of tax-funded 
social protection expansion (or retrenchment) relying on corporate, households and 
consumption (table A13 and A14). Results are computed for the period 1990-2007 and 1995-
2007 and are in points of GDP. 
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Table AII-  18: Estimation of the evolution of tax-funded social protection receipts between 1990 and 2007 
   Corporate  Households  Consumption   Total  
  1990-2007 
 Denmark              0.60    -            4.28    -            1.32    -            5.00    
Norway              1.97    -            3.04    -            3.04    -            4.10    
Netherlands -            0.20    -            2.57    -            0.63    -            3.40    
Luxembourg (Grand-Duché) -            0.25    -            1.28    -            0.27    -            1.80    
Austria              0.26                 0.53    -            0.29                 0.50    
Finland              1.07    -            0.41    -            0.06                 0.60    
United Kingdom -            0.03                 1.49                 0.25                 1.70    
Spain              0.78                 1.11                 0.71                 2.60    
Germany (including ex-GDR from 1991)              0.40                 0.81                 1.49                 2.70    
Italy              0.38                 2.96                 1.15                 4.50    
France              0.70                 2.98                 1.22                 4.90    
Own calculation, using OECD and Eurostat data.  
Table AII-  19: Estimation of the evolution of tax-funded social protection receipts between 1995 and 2007 
   Corporate  Households  Consumption   Total  
  1995-2007 
Denmark              0.35    -            3.48    -            1.37    -            4.50    
Norway              2.03    -            2.79    -            3.65    -            4.40    
Finland              0.38    -            2.33    -            2.25    -            4.20    
Sweden              0.22    -            1.89    -            1.93    -            3.60    
United Kingdom -            0.15                 0.03    -            1.57    -            1.70    
Netherlands -            0.07    -            1.01    -            0.42    -            1.50    
Luxembourg (Grand-Duché) -            0.41    -            0.50    -            0.39    -            1.30    
Ireland              0.31    -            0.03    -            0.77    -            0.50    
Austria              0.33    -            0.21    -            0.52    -            0.40    
Spain              0.95                 0.24                 0.01                 1.20    
Belgium              0.55                 0.44                 0.41                 1.40    
Germany (including ex-GDR from 1991)              0.55                 0.35                 0.90                 1.80    
Greece              0.49                 1.40                 0.41                 2.30    
France              0.56                 2.04                 0.50                 3.10    
Italy              0.31                 2.38                 0.91                 3.60    
Portugal              1.09                 1.24                 2.17                 4.50    
Own calculation, using OECD and Eurostat data.  
The main result is that corporate tax revenue remained relatively stable, whereas an increase 
(decrease) in tax-funded social protection induced an increase (decrease) in households and 
consumption taxation.  
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Between 1990 and 2007, less than 15% of the tax-revenue dedicated to new social spending 
comes from corporate taxation in France Germany and Italy, less than 30% in Spain. Between 
1995 and 2007 the share is slightly more important. 
7.3.2. Implicit tax rate on capital, labour and consumption due to social protection 
expenditure 
Based on the same assumption (social protection expenditure are paid by the average tax- 
payer), I compute the evolution of the implicit tax-rate due to social protection. 
  
   
  
  
     
Where    
  
  is the implicit tax rate on the tax base i due to social protection,    implicit tax 
rate on i,    is the average tax rate and sp is the level of budgetary social expenditure in GDP 
point. Here again social security contribution (and corresponding expenditure) are excluded. 
Figure AII-  1: Change in implicit tax rate, due to budgetary SP expenditure 90-08 (points of tax rate) 
 
“impactl” (in blue) is the change in implicit labour taxation. 
“impactk” (in red) is the change in implicit capital taxation. 
“impactc” (in green) is the change in consumption taxation. 
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Figure AII-  2: Change in implicit tax rate, due to budgetary SP expenditure 95-07 
 
It is worth noticing that here the distinction is not between households and corporation but 
between labour and capital. Thus capital taxation includes the taxation of household's capital 
(higher in average than the taxation of the sole corporate profit). Examination of Figure A1, 
A2 and A3 shows that capital taxation in Bismarckian countries appears less sensitive than 
other form of taxation to increase in social protection expenditure. However capital taxation 
seems to contribute more to social protection in France and Spain than in Germany, Italy, 
Portugal Belgium and Austria. 
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Figure AII-  3: Implicit tax rate related to social protection expenditure (own calculation, points of tax rate)
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7.4. Long term evolution of social security contributions in 
Bismarckian countries 
Social security contributions (here in point of GDP) grow fast during the 60-70's and attain a 
maximum point during the 80's or 90's. At this point they remain almost steady
47
. 
Figure AII-  4: Social security contributions by country 1965-2010 (points of GDP) 
  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
47 Brutal decrease in France in 1998 is an artifact due to the transformation of a share of employees contribution 
into CSG. 
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Figure AII-  5: All countries together (points of GDP) 
 
The maximum point is not attained at the same date for each country. 
Figure AII-  6: Decomposition between employer and employee social contributions (points of GDP) 
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7.5. Is budgetary social protection expenditure funded through 
deficit spending? 
Is the increasing trend of social protection expenditure in Bismarckian countries to ascribe to 
deficit spending? Manow (2010) stresses the correlation between welfare regime, 
independence of central bank and indebtedness level. Focusing on public spending in general 
his perspective is different of mine (I only focus on social protection spending), but he 
suggests that Bismarckian countries maintained a high level of social expenditure by running 
higher debts. A look at the co-variation of deficit spending and social protection expenditure 
brings some nuance to this result. 
In the paper I stress the fact that budgetary expenditure have funded the most part of the 
increase in social expenditure of Bismarckian countries (whereas social contribution revenue 
have been rather steady). A good question is to determine whether this new budgetary 
expenditure has been funded through deficit spending or not. From an analytical point of 
view, the increase in budgetary social protection spending may be funded through three 
different channels i) raising tax-revenue ii) spending deficit iii) cutting other public 
expenditure. In this appendix I propose an analytical decomposition of the funding of social 
protection expenditure since 1980. 
Results shows that the increase in social protection spending in Bismarckian countries can 
clearly not be ascribed to an increase in deficit spending, but primarily to cuts in other public 
expenditure and also to increase in tax-revenue. Obviously I do not pretend that the level of 
social spending has no relation with the level of public indebtedness: to some extent cutting 
social expenditure could be a means to reduce the deficit and thus the indebtedness. But for 
my concern it matters to determine whether new social expenditure have been funded through 
credit (thus through an inter-temporal trade-off) or if they have been paid on effective tax 
revenue. 
7.5.1. Long term decomposition 
I propose following analytical decomposition (delta is the difference between 1980 and 2007): 
                                                                                 
Since social security contributions (SSC) are earmarked to social protection expenditure I 
subtract SSC both from SP spending, tax revenue and public spending, to focus on the sole 
balance between non SSC tax-revenue and budgetary spending. 
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Results are displayed in table AII- 20. This analysis from date to date is to consider carefully, 
since its results are highly sensitive to the economic cycle. For instance taking 1981 for 
starting points instead of 1980 for France reduces the deficit increase from 2.48 to 0.4 points 
of GDP. However these statistics tend to show that, France being an exception, the increase in 
public social expenditure cannot be related to an increase in deficit spending in Bismarckian 
countries, especially for countries with a rapid increase in social spending (e.g. Italy). 
Figure A7 displays a decomposition of the variations of social protection expenditure 
including social security contribution and using different data (Eurostat ESSPRO) and 
different period (1990 and 2007). The results are comparable to the previous one 
Figure AII-  7: The variations of SP expenditure 1990-2007 
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Table AII-  20: Variation of budgetary social protection spending, deficit spending, Tax revenue between 1980 and 
2007 in points of GDP 
 
Variation 
in 
budgetary 
social 
protection 
expenditure 
Variation in Net 
lending/net 
borrowing (- means 
increase in deficit 
or decrease in 
surplus) 
Variation of 
other public 
expenditure 
(- means cut 
in public 
expenditure) 
Variation 
in tax 
revenue 
Time 
Period 
Netherlands -1.84 4.11 -5.21 -2.95 1980-2007 
Austria 2.33 2.44 -8.84 -4.07 1980-2007 
United 
Kingdom 
3.14 0.54 -5.22 -1.54 1980-2007 
Finland 3.21 1.51 0.49 5.21 1980-2007 
Italy 5.19 5.48 0.20 10.86 1980-2007 
France 8.68 -2.48 -0.99 5.20 1980-2007 
Belgium 0.73 9.73 -10.33 0.12 1985-2007 
Denmark 0.90 6.10 -5.57 1.44 1990-2007 
Luxembourg 1.28 -0.62 -3.08 -2.42 1990-2007 
Germany* 2.03 3.12 -4.09 1.06 1991-2007 
Sweden -8.14 14.75 -12.38 -5.77 1993-2007 
Ireland 1.32 2.34 -6.12 -2.46 1993-2007 
Norway -1.96 14.27 -7.32 4.98 1995-2007 
Spain -0.24 8.39 -5.43 2.72 1995-2007 
Greece 1.60 2.37 -3.09 0.88 1995-2007 
Portugal 4.17 1.82 -3.22 2.77 1995-2007 
Column1 = -column 2 –column 3 + column 4. OECD data 
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7.5.2. Dynamic descriptive statistics 
For a more dynamic analysis of the co variations between deficit and social spending, I 
propose to compute the share of deficit spending that should be ascribed to social spending. I 
thus build following indicator: 
                                 
                                      
                                           
 
To avoid breaks in OECD series, data displayed above start in 1995 for some countries 
(Greece, Portugal, Spain for instance). However verifications made on old OECD series, 
including 1982 1984 1989 and 1990 for those countries do not change the analysis. 
Whereas there is a clear correlation between deficit spending and social protection 
expenditure in liberal and Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, 
UK), this is clearly not the case for our Bismarckian sample. 
Figure AII-  8: Total Deficit and budgetary expenditure for SP purpose (points of GDP) 
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Figure AII-  9: Deficit spending due to SP expenditure (own calculation, points of GDP) 
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7.6. Evolution of SP expenditure by branch (in points of GDP) 
Here are displayed OECD series on SP spending by branch (SOCX data base). Old age and 
health expenditure are the main components of social protection expenditure and the one with 
the fastest increase. Data also make obvious that complementarities exist between assistance 
and insurance (e.g. "survivor" assistance and "old age" pensions below) or between seemingly 
unrelated scheme (e.g. unemployment and disability in UK). This is one of the reasons why 
this paper consider together all type of social expenditure. 
Figure AII-  10: Spending for Old age and Survivors (points of GDP) 
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Figure AII-  11: Public health expenditure  in points of GDP 
 
Figure AII-  12: Public Family expenditure in points of GDP 
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Figure AII-  13: "Public Housing" and "Other social policy areas" expenditure (points of GDP) 
 
Figure AII-  14: Social protection expenditure incapacity related (points of GDP) 
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Figure AII-  15: Active and passive labour market programmes (points of GDP) 
 
Figure AII-  16: Main social protection expenditure by branch (points of GDP) 
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